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# "Roulez! Il n'y a rien à voir," Or, "Seeing White": From Phenomenology to Psychoanalysis and Back

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## Introduction

THIS CHAPTER PROCEEDS ON A COMMONPLACE: seeing "white" as a racial category with a number of cultural, political, and economic associations emerged over about three centuries. The "becoming-visible" of white has a history that is different from Europeans' accounts of "seeing black," though the two histories depend on each other. Weaving historical instances of seeing "black," seeing "Jew," seeing "other" together with the question of seeing white, I begin with a phenomenological question: What does "seeing" mean at all? The limitations of classical phenomenology lie in its focus on intentionality and "logical grammar," which bracket all that which "I" do not intend to say, see, or think. But seeing color, seeing otherness—and so, seeing white—require that phenomenological "seeing" be supplemented by those emotions and conceptual associations that accompany, semiconsciously, our conscious perceptions. The emergence of "seeing white" must pass through a phenomenology of perception, which is always overarched by a linguistic or symbolic dimension. But "seeing white" requires that we have some access to the cultural associations that escape phenomenology. These have been explored by psychologies of colonization and authority. One of the more intriguing confrontations, between Franz Fanon and Octave Mannoni, shows the pitfalls of what "seeing white" meant for a Martinican psychologist and a colonial psychoanalyst in the 1940s and 1950s. From this psychology of cultural "seeing," I turn back to the question of seeing, this time as gaze and everdayness.. Seeing white, I argue, takes on complexity under circumstances of "interruption,"

when a person in positions of symbolic or political dominance is obliged to see him/herself (partly) as "being seen," rather than simply seeing and classifying (others).

### I. Seeing Color, Or: the Historic Sedimentation of the (White) Social Imaginary

The history of "seeing color" seems easier to write than that of "seeing white." Numerous histories of European and American characterization of others have produced a rich documentation of the rise of what has come to be called "scientific racism." Much of this history is rooted in clusters of concepts and practices of a near hallucinatory variety, from craniometry to phrenology to physiognomy;[1] from neurology[2] to morphology;[3] from sexology[4] to the "signs" of the "biogenetic law"[5] and of "neoteny."[6]

For obvious reasons, between the mideighteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, images of whiteness, like the studies of white societies, have been less popular and often perceived, by Europeans and white Americans, as lacking critical interest, a largely tautological repetition of the standard—except when one considers whiteness as a feminine characteristic; in that framework, white functions as a sign of refinement, purity, *or* diseased pallor, effeminacy, degeneracy.

Within the white paradigm of the European nineteenth century, alternate "essences" are posited in ways that reinforce the so-called normality of the European Christian mind and body. Among the British, for example, Francis Galton photographed dozens of Jewish high school boys and proceeded to superimpose three to four photographs at a time, with a view to adumbrating the "essences" of the "Jew" through his composite images. Indeed, social and "scientific" approaches to Jews in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe provide acute indicators of the impact of racist social imaginaries on *what* one perceives. For, Jews were alternately considered white *and* not-white, degenerate or infantile *yet* intellectually gifted, according to the strategies and goals of a particular discourse. A similar binaristic ambivalence is found toward Asians;[7] less ambivalence was evinced toward Africans.

For all that, in the nineteenth century whiteness remained a category less significant than those of health, character and its sexual markers, caste position, skull shape and physiognomy, criminality and its forensic "indicators," which crossed over neatly with some of the "attributes" of "savages."[8]

In all these cases, nonwhiteness is articulated around three basic signifying clusters: childishness or effeminacy; moral and physical degeneracy; and hypersexuality or perversity. All of these are anchored in a posited racial or na-

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tional essence, itself determined generally by two of these three clusters. Yet essence—whether it is sought *within* the body (cf. the great popularity and painterly dramas of autopsies of prostitutes in the nineteenth century), or in the *expressions* of the face or its ossature (jaw lines, eyebrow bones, skull size and shapes, etc.), or in behavior—demands a verifiable (which tended to mean visualizable) anchor and vouchsafe, in the nineteenth century.

If much of this imagery is forgotten or the subject of derision today, it remains sedimented in the visual and rhetorical social imaginary of Western societies and is reflected with irony and satire in contemporary art,[9] *even as* it is reworked in some contemporary "sciences" and works like *The Bell Curve*. In its elaboration over two centuries,[10] the "visual" indices of European "normalcy" work by effacing themselves. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is that in debates about human natures and essences, the concern to present a gamut of qualities whose proper balance the European possessed, led to imaginative exaggerations of other ("colored") positions on theoretical lines that ordered excesses and deficiencies in body structure, in intelligence and maturity, and in facial and cranial architectures. Thus, concerns focused on visual depictions of the other *over* the acknowledgment of variations—related to class position, region, ethnic history, and so on—among the Europeans themselves, except insofar as the latter served the purposes of criminal anthropologies like that of Lombroso, or determinations of intelligence and character[11] (Darwin was, we recall, almost refused passage on the *Beagle*, given physiognomist concerns about his character, as voiced by the ship's captain). The second reason was the antiquated and romanticized image of Europeans: how many images of *Greek* or *Roman* profiles were employed as *the* paradigm of European humanity in these treatises, it would be hard to enumerate. Moreover, the essence of white, European masculinity was abstract: rationalist, detached but possessed of a socially validated scopic power to judge and to classify, the seer did not require being seen, except when it proved necessary to draw economic or psychiatric distinctions. What white then looked like was often a matter of the white woman, whose body and face were never points from which visual mastery could be deduced. That is, unlike European men, European women did not have the validated gaze; women were observed and at times responded in such ways that it was obvious they suspected the stakes of the game. This is clear in the images preserved of the (largely female) population of hysterics in France and England.[12] Thanks to performances elicited from them, poor women, whose lives were often at risk from spouses, employers, or pimps, found some safety in large urban psychiatric hospitals in nineteenth-century Europe. In return for this, they formed the exemplars of a vast literature on the essence of "feminine," psychosexual diseases.[13]

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What then is there to "see" in whiteness? In the nineteenth century, and up to the first World War, this question could hardly be raised in a self-reflective, political analysis. The irony of this recalls the French police remark, directed against the curious in cases of immigration *razzias* or roundups: "Roulez, il n'y a rien à voir!" ["Drive on, there is nothing to see!"] This *rien*, of course, belongs to the operation of foreclosed paradigms, which efface themselves and their self-referentiality, in their effective deployment.

## II. A Phenomenology (of Whiteness) Concerns Perception—When It Is Combined with Language

Let us step to the side of this question and ask what it means, philosophically, to *see anything*. In other words, what is "seeing" itself? We overlook this question often enough, supposing that it is too obvious to consider. Thus, seeing, or perception, is a constitutive mental act, which, along with understanding and recollection, presents us with perspectives on an object "out there" or an event that is "actual." Seeing holds the privilege of evidence *and* distance—that is, an event is witnessed with my own eyes, even if it is out of the range of tactile contact. The eyewitness is thus to be preferred over one who knows by hearsay. And the visual approach to a being or to a horizon is the one privileged by the "science" of what appears, *phaino*- [to shine forth, and by extension, to appear *clearly*] menology. Can phenomenology teach us anything about whiteness, as it appears or as it effaces itself?[14] I believe it can, up to an important limit. Beyond the limit one must turn to what Cornelius Castoriadis has called "social imaginaries"[15] and to psychology. I return to the question of psychology for whiteness theory in a moment. Here, let us look at two paradoxes intrinsic to phenomenology with a view to understanding why, in the matter of seeing white, there may seem to be *rien à voir* outside of specific, extraphenomenological meanings.

### IIa. The Contradictions of Phenomenology as a Philosophy of Perception

Phenomenologist Renaud Barbaras has characterized the challenge to classical phenomenology, so far as it claims to be more than empirical observation and seeks to accede to something like a science of the visible. He points out that:

> A philosophy of perception [here, phenomenology] is faced with two seemingly contradictory requirements. On the one hand, perception is openness toward reality: its object is given as residing in itself, as preceding the act that makes it ap-

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> pear without owing anything to this act. Nevertheless, on the other hand, [our] access to this reality is dependent on its appearance; that which gives itself as being is nothing *other* than that which appears. This is how we translate the fact that it is someone who perceives, that is, that the being of the world [or of ourselves and others] is measured by my *power to make it appear*. Thus phenomenality [what is perceived] enfolds Being, inasmuch as there is no being which is not perceived; but Being in turn *embraces phenomenality*, since what is proper to the perceived is that it gives itself as something that always exceeds its manifestations.[16]

If we recognize that "openness toward reality" involves *more* than just passively perceiving whiteness, then we must also *historicize* the conviction that, as a quality supposed to have some objective value, whiteness may not precede the acts that *make it appear*. However, once the conditions of its appearance are socially and symbolically analyzed, whiteness will appear much the way other qualities appear that "precede the act that makes them appear"; that is, as constructed and sedimented rather than "given." A phenomenology of symbolic and cultural "facts" must approach its acts as open to the question of whether they are indeed other than that which can appear at different epochs or under specific circumstances. Nevertheless, to the extent that whiteness belongs to a perceptual field (visually, by audition as "white voices," or by other sensory means), it falls under a specific regional ontology (sociology, ethnography) within phenomenological research. Its grasp, however, will be related to the power of an "I," or society of "I's," to *make whiteness appear*, as Barbaras remarks.

According to the founder of contemporary phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, reality presents itself by sketches or profiles. These part-entities can always be assembled to determine at least simple essences, and this is what Husserl means by his first phenomenological technique called the *Wesenschau* (or essences-gaze). The idea of a constructivist approach to perceptual realities, which passes through the synthesis of perceptible "essences," is an old one for science *and* pseudo-science. It even recalls Galton's composite "essence" of the Jew, created through the use of photographs superimposed on one another.[17] While Galton's racist, pre-phenomenological quest for essences has little to do with the twentieth-century phenomenological enterprise, the passion for constituting simple essences is an intrinsic part of the phenomenological undertaking. It requires a technical apparatus consisting of "reductions," including an "eidetic reduction" (to essences) and a "transcendental reduction" (designed to uncover the activity of psychic life itself, as consciousness re-presenting itself to itself, or passing beyond itself to an intended object or *presence*).

To the question, "what do we 'see' in seeing whiteness?" we have to respond in a roundabout way. There is no doubt that we "see" whiteness as a quality of

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persons. It seems hard to deny that one's social, ethnic, and gender position will have an impact on how readily we see whiteness and what other qualities we attach to that of whiteness. This is related to the paradox Barbaras introduced above: it is there, but an "I" or group of "I's" must also *make* whiteness appear. It is also related to what E. Levinas and J. Derrida have observed about language in Husserl's first great work of phenomenology, *The Logical Investigations*. We must understand this before answering the question of seeing whiteness—because visual perception alone cannot tell us enough about how one sees color or "race."

### IIb. Language Doubles Our Perception: Or, the Symbiosis of Our Perception and Our Concepts

Early phenomenology entailed the confidence that what-is (presence) is truly *available* to human consciousness, understood as intentionality. Intentionality means that all consciousness, for Husserl, is consciousness-of something, whether this is a (white) person or object, or a memory, or a state of mind. Intentionality, along with the "living present" that is consciousness present to itself, are two core suppositions of phenomenology. Both suppositions proceed on the confidence that our consciousness, as a dynamic movement able to go beyond itself or into itself, is able to perceive and to describe all objects it finds in its purview. Later, phenomenology encountered two halting points limiting its optimism: our death, which clearly escapes experience per se, and the encounter with another person, who also escapes our perceptual grasp, despite her or his resemblance to us.

Barring these two halting points, one could infer from these remarks that all the world can be a spectacle for phenomenology. And we could discern visible essences and qualities—fundamental ways of being—no matter what they were, *independently* of the meanings and values carried by the words attached to them. But that would be to underestimate the scope of Husserl's phenomenology. On reading Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, Emmanuel Levinas glimpsed the problem of the range and power of word meanings. While phenomenology begins as a description of lived perceptual experience, Husserl recognized that mental life, as "intentional," is experienced as much symbolically (i.e., in language) as perceptually. Thus, moving beyond the empiricism of "things seen," Husserl's phenomenology acknowledged that the domain of *linguistic meanings* itself "covers . . . the entire domain of intentionality, outside that of [our] immanent constitution of time," which is just consciousness as an unceasing flow. Levinas adds, in what is a counter-intuitive conclusion, "To understand that the word signifies something is to grasp the very movement of intentionality itself."[18] Thus, perception and discourse—what we see

and the symbols and meanings of our social imaginaries—prove inextricable the one from the other.

Now, if this is the case, then ultimately phenomenology not only proceeds on a theory of perception as "meaning-giving" through intentional consciousness in the world, but phenomenology requires a theory of linguistic (social and historical) meaning. Most important, perception and discursive meanings prove so intertwined that if a word or sentence had no meaning for a subject, it would be hard to see how that sentence could be intentionally constituted as an object of consciousness. This, I suspect, is the case for whiteness in the eighteenth (and part of the nineteenth) centuries. The concept of whiteness per se had little discursive meaning for the European who observed and classified other races, outside of general claims about others as "nonwhite." Thus the history of what we might call the *becoming-visible* of whiteness has yet to be written. However, *that* whiteness, as a complex of visibles, or meaningful perceivable qualities, is (like countless other objects we overlook in their habitual appearing) a historically determined perceptual event is undoubtable. This is why Levinas's conclusion, "Thus the phenomenon of the signification of the word"—noteworthy here is a word like *white* or *whiteness*—"will remain *the key to this notion* [of intentionality]," is precious. Language, or the symbolic dimension of human experience, is not only intertwined with human social and psychological perception, it is a primary ingredient in the construction that is perception.

And yet a word is not an image. In fact, a spoken word is not symbolic per se. Just to say *white* is not necessarily to symbolize, because *white* is not perceived for itself. Levinas adds, citing Husserl, that the word "is like a window through which we look at what it signifies."[19] If words like *white* stood alone, we would have little reason to speak of a symbolic dimension at all. It is that a spoken word, so far as it points toward something, functions like a window through which we see, *at another level of perception*, what it signifies. But we rarely communicate with just one- or two-word utterances. The window simile must be complicated to grasp how we see *white* symbolically—that is, through our social and historical imaginaries.

### IIc. The Conjunction of Phenomenology and Psychology: Derrida's Criticism of Husserl

The complication of Levinas's window simile is provided by Derrida's study of speech as expression and indication in his *Voice and Phenomenon.*[20] Agreeing with Levinas's commentary, Derrida explains that the famous reductions of phenomenology, designed to get to the bare facts of perceptual experience, cannot hold human language out of play because language is *the* mode through

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which our living consciousness is present to itself. It appears to be simple common sense that our consciousness is present to us, fully and dynamically, through our internal monologue, no matter how many "voices" may arise in it, no matter how clearly conscious we are of specific words used, at a given moment, in that monologue. Yet the common sense begins to break up when Husserl draws two important distinctions: first, between consciousness approached psychologically and consciousness *revealed* by the phenomenological brackets he sets on it; second, between words as said and all those indications that surround words and make linguistic communication possible—pauses, exclamations, tones, associations, implications, and so on.

Husserl's project is a philosophy of life and concrete things. This is the core of its value for the intersubjective experience of whiteness, whether as a social, a cultural, or a psychological phenomenon. But Husserl's project is this precisely insofar as language holds *life* and *ideality* (ideas and memories) together. We could not form ideas about things, construct or perceive essences, if we could not repeat words, in living speech within us or outwardly, as utterances. Thus the voice, as signification, "seems to preserve ideality and living presence *in all its forms*" (*Speech and Phenomenon*, 10).

This living presence of our consciousness to itself, with its images, words, pauses, affects, and so on, is *one* life—ours. Husserl's phenomenological goal is to unveil this life as the "purely psychic" by holding aside our assumptions about subjective states or objective things out there in the world. Despite Husserl's elaborate technique of holding assumptions aside (i.e., his phenomenological "reduction"), the psychic or "transcendental life" he lays bare is, in all things, identical with "psychological" life, *though he insists that these two, the transcendental and the psychological, are different.* Certainly, they are different epistemologically—one is unveiled by phenomenology, the other is explored in various psychologies. But, Derrida reminds us, the "difference distinguishes nothing, [it is] a difference separating no state, no experience, no determined signification" (*Speech and Phenomenon*, 11).

Derrida's point is this: even though Husserl's "transcendental ego" is different from his *natural ego*, the difference has no event or object to hold it fixed in its difference. Even if I can make myself a phenomenological spectator of my own psychic self, it remains me, my psychic self, which is in question. This observation is of extreme importance because it shows clearly that phenomenology not only can be woven together with psychology (and, as we will see, with psychoanalytic observations), but that phenomenology can be *filled out by psychology* in cases like that of seeing whiteness.

I am condensing the arguments in Husserl and Derrida for reasons of space and in order to come to the basic question about "seeing whiteness." We were following the claims about language as an order of meaning that is inter-

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twined with all intentionality (i.e., of all consciousness-of things). The upshot is this: if there is a level of experience that *escapes* language as signification, then *either* we will not be able to speak about it (could this be the experience of seeing white, seeing black—and if so, up until what historical moment?), *or* we will have to distinguish words as ideal objects and historical products, *from* words that are somehow "more" than cultural and historical things. This is where Husserl's notion of the voice or "speech in its transcendental flesh"—the way inner speech lives embodied in us and for us—comes in (*Speech and Phenomenon*, 16).

You might wonder what relevance these complex investigations into the life of the self—made possible by the phenomenological reduction[21]—have for seeing whiteness, or blackness, or otherness. But we know already, from criticisms about color blindness to the abjection and cost of acts of "othering," that seeing color is not just an interesting historically- and culturally-rooted act of spontaneous cognition. This seeing (which also involves hearing, feeling, valuing) affects us precisely at the level of the sensuous and affective life most intimate to us. If phenomenology can afford us a glimpse into a pre-expressive stratum of our experience, then we will get a fuller understanding of what such seeing involves.

The difficulty posed by the interdependence of linguistic meaning (which Husserl takes in its form of *logical* grammar, not *psychoanalytic* grammar, thereby leaving out unintended acts, acts in bad faith, psychic symptoms, etc.) and the intentional life of consciousness drives Husserl to search for some presence *not* mediated by language. But this quest drives him toward the inner *voice* as basic apperception (perception of self by self), rather than toward pure seeing. Consequently, Husserl's pursuit of a pre-verbal layer of consciousness leads him not to a psychological pre- or un-conscious, but to a crucial distinction within language itself, between language made up of expressive and indicative signs *and* our inner language made up of pure expression. All communication between subjects, he argues, will be a combination of expression (words said) and their conditions of meaningfulness (indicative "signs"). An indicative sign is any tone or mark (or silence) that *does not express any idea or thing* "unless [it also] happen[s] to fulfill a meaning *as well as* an indicative function." (*Speech and Phenomenon*, 20).

Indicative signs, or "indication," fill up the gaps in our speech. They point beyond a particular expression, connecting meaningful words to the host of things that those words do not specifically say, there and then. In this respect, no interpersonal communication is conceivable without "indication." This is simply because the other person is not present to us the way we are present to ourselves. Their absence must be supplemented with references and substitutions *in order to pass, in thought, from one thing to another thing*, or from one sentence to the

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next. Indication works as a linkage. It links two consciousnesses. It also links actual consciousness to what is *not* present in our consciousness. Indication is thus our connections to culture, to historical sedimentations of meaning, to unstated beliefs, unreflected images, and so on—all those things that condition our seeing other or seeing white, whether they are half- or un-conscious.

However, by Husserl's argument, our inner monologue has no need for indication, because in inner monologue we are fully present to ourselves as living consciousness; so much so that we *never really communicate anything "new" to ourselves* in our pre-discursive (or pre-social) monologue. This is true even though the inner monologue seems to speak all by itself, without our willed intervention.

Now Derrida's insight, here, consists in recognizing a move that is more traditional to philosophy (*and* psychology) than Husserl realized. In positing the originality and immediacy of our inner monologue, Husserl divides absolute presence (to self) *not only from interpersonal communication using indication, but also* from re-presentation, that is, from re-presented memories, images, and signs. We find ourselves returned to a distinction between apperception (of self by self) *versus* perception (of things or as representations), and one typical of classical psychology between originary *versus* secondary mental presence. And yet, even if we insist, with Husserl, that what "I" say "outwardly" is not the same as what "I" say "inwardly," neither of these two directions really entail places at all. They are just movements, not places in some inner or outer world. Moreover, despite Husserl's insistence on "*logical* grammar," which excludes from his discussion of meaning all those things we *do not intend* to say (slips of the tongue, forgettings, grimaces, twitches, silences, and so on), it remains true that meaning as expression always indicates. Meaning is possible *because of* the gaps, forgettings, the indirect references, tones, pauses, and the like, which surround and make expression possible. We cannot bracket indication in intersubjective situations. But Derrida shows that we cannot legitimately "bracket" or reduce indication in inner speech, either. Now, Husserl had insisted on inner speech as our immediate presence to self—that inner voice which was not like everyday language because it dispensed with indication. For Derrida, when we speak to ourselves we are speaking metaphorically to be sure, but we are speaking all the same, since our internal monologue proceeds thanks to signifiers. And though those inner words may not be spoken aloud within us, there *are no other signifiers with which we communicate than words,* whether we are speaking with others or with ourselves. That means there is no pure seeing and no deep self that is not already determined by the language(s) it learns and by its society and history. What we see, like what we can think, is conditioned by the words and indicators we learn.

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Derrida's argument does two things. It vitiates Husserl's dream of an immediate, prelinguistic dimension of our lived experience. Further, it *historicizes* what was supposed to be somehow prior to words, or deeper than their historical-cultural sense. There would thus be no beginning in ab-solute (i.e., not relative to words) presence (to self). And there would be no ultimate difference between real words and our imagined words (*Speech and Phenomenon*, 43). The absolute certainty of self-presence, via the inner voice, must be connected to the historical and cultural conditions already obvious in intersubjective communication.

If Derrida is right, then the historical mutations of words like *white, whiteness, blackness, yellow, feminine,* and so on are always interwoven with socialized indication and its networks of meaning—both binary and complex ones.[22] And, if there is no pre-originary—that is, no directly perceived *or* apperceived—perception or expression, then there is no immediate or primary experience of the other as white or black or other—that is, none without language.

This claim is both compelling in its historical power and confounding in that it seems to eliminate the immediacy of our experiences of otherness. Certainly the eighteenth-century European perceived not so much whites or blacks, but Frenchmen, Chinese people, Africans, Indians, or again, types: "the mad," "the beggar," "the syphilitic"—all of which are anchored by other signifiers. If nineteenth-century national, cultural, economic, and "nosological" typologies have become simplified with the perception of whiteness or blackness, they have also become complexified, differently, since cultural and economic perceptions have anything but disappeared. These perceptions accompany what is a more insidious range of *types* of whiteness, blackness, and of multi-racial perception at work in Western perception today.[23]

Classical phenomenology sought a level of psychic immediacy at which perception, in its purity (i.e., without everyday language) could be described. Astute commentators of Husserl, from Levinas to Derrida, have argued that language, words (including *white* and *whiteness,* etc.), cover the entire range of intentional life, all the way to our passive, that is, spontaneous, time consciousness as it flows along. But Derrida has argued, further, that that "other" immediate presence to self (not just time consciousness), that is, the living inner voice, is already a language that uses the same signs and the same *indication* as discursive language. The inner voice (however aware we are of "its" signifiers) is just language. It too is mediated through indication—through silences, implications, and associated meanings. Therefore, even our deepest presence to self is historically and culturally conditioned. We saw why this is compelling for seeing white in section one. In short, until the concept *whiteness* matured as historical and political, for Europeans,[24] there was nothing much there to see. "*Roulez, il n'y a rien à voir*."

### III. The Discourse of "Biological" Racism and its Symbolic Impact

By Derrida's arguments, we "see" whiteness as whiteness becomes a culturally meaningful signifier. How does whiteness become such a signifier? The question is historical, political, economic, and cultural. To answer it by tracing something like a linear genealogy would just drift back toward the illusion of absolute beginnings. "White" is already present, if indirectly, in what Gustav Jahoda calls "the shift in perspective away from the question of the relationship between humans and apes, and towards an ordering of human races according to their supposed degree of proximity to apes, [which itself] was indicative of a shift from Enlightenment values towards racial intolerance" (*Images of Savag*es, 53).[25]

This shift, dating at least from Buffon (1766), contains a displacement in attitudes and presumably in language. Jahoda illustrates it dramatically with the figure of Anthony William Amo, who was brought from the Guinea coast to Holland in 1707. Amo was educated first in Holland, then at the University of Halle (1729), and thereafter at Wittenberg. He wrote a treatise, was duly respected for his intellectual gifts, and moved to Jena, where he taught philosophy. Jahoda points out, however, "A few years later he became subjected to what we would call racist attacks and was forced to return to Africa in 1747" (*Images of Savag*es, 53). It is not clear whether, or when, Amo would have returned to Africa had he not been forced out of Jena; it is very clear, however, that in the eyes of his attackers, who "saw black," Africa was "where he belonged."

With respect to critical self-reflection, seeing white appears to postdate Europeans' seeing black or yellow or red. Even the radical materialist Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709–1751)—for whom the idea of the soul (whether in Europeans or other humans) was just a bad metaphor for the hypercomplexity of the body and so lacked reality[26]—was given to "seeing other" on the basis of blackness, brownness, or bodies. In a section of his *Œuvres philosophiques* (1751), entitled "On savage men, called Satyrs," he observed:

> They [satyr-men] run fast and have unbelievable strength. In front of the body they have nowhere any hair; but on the back one gets the impression of a forest of black bristling hair, the whole back being covered with it. The face of these animals resembles a human face.
>
> [But] nothing is more lascivious, more shameless, and more disposed to fornication, than these animals. (*Images of Savag*es, 42)

Having freed himself of the burden of attributing or denying to humans a metaphysical soul, de la Mettrie boasted that he had seen one such "animal" at the fair in St. Laurent. But what *was* it? Rather than attending to his own

phantasmic lapses, he compares the creature to a mythical being, a satyr, presumably because of his "observation" of its "shameless" sexuality. But he also insists that its visage "resembles a human face." The Cartesian-Buffon claim that linguistic competence is a sign of humanity (the presence of a soul) being irrelevant to de la Mettrie, we confront a signifying complex, in his work, of mythical creatures, apes, metaphoric satyrs, and "savages." Against this, as suggested by the metaphor of a "forest of black bristling hair" covering "the whole back," we have, implicit, a seeing of whiteness (which does not bristle, contains no black hairy forests, is not lascivious, etc.), of true humanity, and capacities for sublimation and virtue. All this is *implicit* in the fantastic claims he ventures. This example illustrates a small part of the perverse history of the subdivisions of humanity and animality in light of the entrenched conception of a Great Chain of being.[27] Needless to say, de la Mettrie's emphasis on sexuality in the satyr-animal[28] combined projective and fantasy elements with Enlightenment concerns[29] with classificatory logics.[30]

The proliferation of fantastic and conflicting classifications of *man* and of *races* in the mideighteenth century ramifies into and contaminates, in the nineteenth century, more recent logics of sexual types and pathologies, criminality, personality, and types of racial-biological "degeneracy." These logics accompany a cluster of diverse forms of racism.[31] From all this, which has been extensively documented, we can conclude that seeing white, like seeing black, seeing Jew, or seeing degeneracy,[32] is historically and culturally determined, and transmitted through expression and "indication"; that is, through things said, but also through the unsaid that makes them possible. Yet, paradoxically, thanks to this transmission,[33] seeing white and seeing black each carries with it *a perceptual immediacy* that both intertwines with received history, and *seems* actually to precede history at the psychological level. It is *as if we immediately "saw" white, or black, and all that these mean.* This immediacy concerns the phantasmic dimension in much of our perception, and the interconnections of fantasy, projection, and anxiety *with* perception. But that cluster, completely bracketed by Husserl because it was extra-intentional—when taken with Derrida's point that Husserl's transcendental ego is indistinguishable from the psychological "ego"—obliges us to look closely at psychoanalytic discussions of fantasy and personality.

## IV. From the Interconnection of the Symbolic and the Perceptual to the Psychology of Culture

The obvious lesson of the *récits de voyage,* missionaries' and colonial administrators' diaries,[34] some eighteen "colonial exhibitions"[35]—not to mention

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the spate of Robinsonade literature about islands and exotic others, from Shakespeare's *The Tempest* through Jonathan Swift and Daniel Defoe—is that Europeans saw in the so-called nonwhite what they feared or loathed in themselves *and* that they were fascinated by the nonwhite so long as he or she remained a docile screen for their projections, erotic and idealizing.

It is at the level of fantasy and projection that psychoanalysis and psychohistory complement phenomenological inquiry into seeing color or seeing white. But psychoanalysis can be a risky tool when it overlooks political and economic conditions in its study of "cultures" or groups. The French psychoanalyst Octave Mannoni, in *Le Racisme revisité*,[36] argued after the Malagasy revolt (1947), what was made obvious thanks to the works of Fanon, Césaire, and others. "The Negro *is* the fear that the White has of himself." And, he asked, "in effect, where is the *Other in this self image* that foments phobia without diminishing hatred?"[37] Now, the work itself is in part dated; yet I want to discuss, here, why it has been reprinted from 1950 to 1999.

Julia Kristeva, Sander Gilman, and others[38] have analyzed at length a group's ability to secrete an abjected, untouchable part of itself, conceiving it as intrinsically *other than* itself. The literature on this is considerable. And, while Mannoni's work is flawed by Eurocentrism,[39] above all when he elaborates a "psychoanalysis" of the French-assimilated Merina, it caught my attention with two provocative insights into those elements of French (European?) values and structures of seeing (in light of "indication"), which took on relief within the institution of colonialism. Mannoni argues that the images and tales of colonial administration[40] promised the French colonial an escape from the economic and cultural demands of European society and prodded his nostalgia for something like the life of a petty noble. Second, despite well-documented limitations, Mannoni tried to bring to light the contours of intersubjectivity in colonial Madagascar, the colonial *Mitsein*—and this, on the colonists themselves. I would insist, from the outset, that of the psychologists concerned with colonialism, Fanon's analyses of Madagascar, like those of some recent scholars,[41] are more powerful, and truer in regard to the oppression and violence of colonial conquest. They are so because they do not proceed primarily from the micro (infancy, family life, socialization) to the macro-levels of colonial existence, as Mannoni often does. Paradoxically, Mannoni had spent twenty years in Madagascar (presumably in Tananarivo), while Fanon had spent little time there. Nevertheless, from his stance as a Martinican psychologist, Fanon was able to evince Mannoni's difficulties (defenses?) in imagining the existence of the colonized Malagasy. I think it is as he says: Mannoni was looking, above all, for explanations of the white colonial "gaze"; asking what lay beneath the colonials' (often-failed) pursuit of wealth (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 302). In his best moments, Mannoni was trying to

see white, looking into European fantasies about native innocence and magical isolation (their own). In short, he inquired about who entered colonial administration, and what emerged from latency once they were installed in a colonial environment. Obviously, the culture whose disciplines define the philosophical and political stakes of seeing and classifying will not become transparent to itself using its own devices. This became abundantly clear after the French massacre of some hundred thousand Malagasies in revolt against colonial rule in 1947. What I am interested in at this point is how Mannoni tried, using psychoanalysis, to see the cultural conditions that encouraged French men to become colonial administrators, and what aspects of their characters developed within the blind *Mitsein* in which they were engaged.

If we combine Mannoni's analyses with recent work on the visual technologies of empire, it is the everyday spectacles, the photographs, and the exotic tales that provided some Frenchmen with the conviction that they could escape from an economic and social system on the Continent in which they led lives, in the main, of mediocrity and relative powerlessness.[42] This manufactured dream encouraged projections that, for Mannoni, teach us more about how French whites saw people of color, and how white colonials came to look in the colonial *Mitsein*, than how Malagasies themselves perceived white men. I thus read Mannoni in two ways: first, to focus on his analysis of projection and fantasy; second, to bring out his own blind spot, which proved common enough to structuralist psychologies, and which accounts for the ease with which Franz Fanon and Aimé Césaire could break down his arguments about the Malagasies, even as they too had recourse to what were sometimes blanket psychoanalytic approaches (*Black Skin White Masks,* 61–62). My point is this: psychoanalysis confronts Husserl's bracketed "indications"; it could do so because it did not begin with a theory of the subject as subject-personality onto which "character predicates" or behavior were grafted.[43] As Edmond Ortigues argued, psychoanalysis pursues personality itself as a (or a multitude of) predicate in a history. This opens a space in which conscious and unconscious values can be explored within cultural contexts. That said, it was Fanon, Césaire, and others who showed that the ambitions of psychoanalysis are worthless without history and economics, without the history and economics of colonialism.[44]

Within a narcissistic economy (arguably, the root of *all* our psychic economies), the visibility of the other appears greater to the degree that it functions as a screen for our projections. This seems especially so when an individual or a group confronts others with whom they have little spontaneous identification. Thus the islander, the African, the *Ostjude* [Eastern European Jews], are the blacker—the more "savage," the more "Jewish," the more "child-like" or "degenerate"—when they function as the anti-ideal or obstacle to a

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positive narcissism, as conceived by the white position, which is doing the projecting.

Yet this tells us little about the view of the white from the side of the one beyond the projection screen. In fact, a host of views of whiteness surface during and after colonization and postcolonial reorganization. What seems invariable is that the narcissistic reflex of ab-jecting and projecting negative (especially fearsome or disgusting) qualities onto an other, to protect the self from itself, seems less universal among colonized others than among European (or American) whites. Can we accredit this just to political dynamics *or* differences of psychology?[45] More interesting is that the abjected or othered persons, *whatever they ultimately do with the projections foisted on them,* internalize the emotional force *and* the imagery of the projections, and this, over considerable periods of time and through political changes. This creates a shattered image of self and body, what Fanon called the corporeal schema doubled by a "historico-racial schema," provided by "the other, the white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories."[46]

## V. Why (Colonial) Whites Saw "Black" while the Colonized Saw . . . a Gaze

After decades of discussion and critique, social structuralisms and psychological history have shown their failings. Mannoni, like Tzvetan Todorov,[47] retains an interest as *a moment* in structural psychology because he attempts to "see white" psychoanalytically, using novels, biography, ethnographic studies, and his twenty years' stay in Madagascar. Moreover, he commits the error that social psychologies must confront: to want to explain too much, within one framework. Indeed, he comes to realize that he was writing in pursuit of his own *desire*, viz., that he believed he could explain *both* Europeanized Malagasies *and* European colonials. If his enterprise fails on the Malagasy side, it does so because he is convinced of the universality of psychoanalytic categories. It fails again because he does not reflect on what Fanon would call a "galaxy of erosive stereotypes" (*Black Skin White Masks,* 129). Yet his failure is an effective introduction to the difficulty of seeing white, because the gaps Mannoni and Fanon both address concern those that Husserl's phenomenology left open, with its focus on *logical* grammar rather than *psychological* grammar. What drives this work is ultimately the will to see the human personality as the dynamic unfolding of our encounters with others, with violence, and with economic and cultural institutions—a will that carries a political dimension with it. Indeed, the political question for the psychology of cultures remains: how to avoid what Bruce Mazlish called the "counter-transference"

problem. It besets efforts at seeing white, in the form of defenses and unacknowledged ambivalence. It blinds intellectuals into believing they are seeing the other, when they are just seeing the other in her or his *Mitsein* or way of being-with, or being-under, the other's (the white's) regard.

This then is Mannoni's dilemma. But he was, I think, the first (white) European to study—with sensitivity *and* opacity—the white colonial and to ask why what French whites saw in the colonized other was *not* what the colonized saw. He thus asked a question similar to Todorov's when he studied the sixteenth-century conquest of Mexico: Why was there relatively little revolt against the white colonizers? Both men have been criticized for missing a point that Fanon, Césaire, and others emphasized: as total violence, colonization destroys the personality of the colonized, with the result that, as Fanon put it in his first book, "When the Negro makes contact with the white world, a certain sensitizing action takes place. If his psychic structure is weak, one observes a collapse of the ego. The black man stops behaving like an actional person."[48] Both Mannoni and Todorov observed this inaction. But Mannoni attributed it to the precolonial acculturalization to dependency (on ancestors), surviving among the Merina. In response, Fanon argued differently. He pointed out that there was resistance, dependence, *and* paralysis in Madagascar. But in so doing, he slid toward a certain inconsistency: the Malagasy "never thought of" the "foreigner . . . as an enemy" (*Black Skin White Masks,* 99). Although this may have been true when the Merina nobles ("Andriana," who themselves took control of much the island in the 1790s) received Protestant missionaries, it was not true when the French overthrew the Merina monarchy (1895–1896). Against Mannoni, he urged that colonization was what accounted for the so-called complex of dependency in the Merina. Of course Fanon's arguments are situated at different levels and historical moments. However, he did not spend years in Madagascar and his first concern was not to see white but to explore what seeing color had come to mean. This is why I am taking a calculated risk with Octave Mannoni, for his discussion of the French colonial psyche strikes me as what has survived best in his work on Madagascar. I hope to show that psychology can supplement phenomenology, provided psychology comes to terms with a *critical history* of the groups it examines. From there, I turn to an existential question: What does it mean to "decenter a gaze," and can we really see white without the experience of being under a gaze?

Mannoni's essay, known in translation as *Prospero and Caliban,* first appeared in 1950 (in English, 1956).[49] The argument sought to be systematic. Moreover, it was itself criticized by Mannoni in an Afterword that he published late, perhaps in response to Fanon and Césaire—although he does not mention them.[50] Before Fanon had published *Black Skin White Masks,* Mannoni was asking how and why it was impossible, from the beginnings of

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French colonialism to its first "ends" in the uprising of the 1950s,[51] to see white the same way that whites saw black. Using this to supplement the phenomenology of seeing white, I now summarize his claims.[52]

We may suppose that the massive expansion of Western techniques, rationality, and values has rendered the psychology of cultures an artifact from the past. Are we not all subject today to globalization, postnational capitalism, accompanying utilitarian and instrumentalist values, and the fragmentation of communities? This was part of Fanon's arguments against Mannoni. Yet the latter's analysis of European culture touched an area to which Fanon would himself be drawn two years after. It pointed to the persistence of a Western *fantasy* of the good savage and a Western quest for gentler or more childlike cultures and psyches. Overlooking the violence of Galliéni's 1896 "pacification" of the island, Mannoni argued that the *Mitsein* created between the French and the (already somewhat *Anglicized*) Merina gave rise to patterns in their relationship. His arguments for Europeans' projection of their own difficulties adapting to technological and economic changes at home, their compensatory quest to dominate others, and their self-delusion about white identity are compelling and recall the work, contemporary with his, of the early Frankfurt School.

Mannoni started from the premise that, even if demythified, the subject *as a lived personality* is never wholly unified, though it will strive to integrate itself. Studying presumably the Hova (Europeanized Malagasy merchants and farmers, many of whom resisted French domination), he found such a will to integration in phenomena of cultural adaptation and bilingualism.[53]

Nevertheless, what Mannoni was most interested in were the differences. In the West, the differences between cultures are illustrated, fixed, and perpetuated by an expanding mass of images, from drawings to etchings to photographs, whether posed or "spontaneous." The images run the gamut from "savages" dressed up and posed with "whites" (*Images of Savag*es, 212) to dignified photos of indigenous persons of rank,[54] to absurd theatrics like the photograph of Fijian "cannibals" from 1890 (*Images of Savag*es, 113), to the French Hottentot Venus, a caricature of so-called "steatopygism" in African women (*Images of Savag*es, 80). These images of blackness, exoticism, infantilism, and hypersexualization became indices of European (and American) projections, whose structure belongs to fetish-making, narcissism, and what I called the three binaries of the adult-child, male-female, health-illness structures. On the other hand, Mannoni, like Fanon, shows that the narrative images of the white in Malagasy stories[55] *also highlight perceived differences*; but they do so according to a noneroticized logic of ambivalence.[56] And Fanon points to their roots in fear and loss of subjecthood.

It is not clear where he spent most of his twenty years in Madagascar, presumably in Tananarive, the Merina capital,[57] far from the Africanized coasts.

But Mannoni's argument addresses the island like a single case, perhaps because he used extensive ethnographic material from the *Académie malgache.* His principal argument was that, prior to French colonial implantation, the Malagasy, no matter what their caste status was (noble, free peasant, slave), grew up inserted into a network of interdependencies that were rooted in the power and authority of their ancestors and in that of their fathers, who pronounced the will of the ancestors in elaborate rituals. Virtually all social relations were anchored in this socio-sacred and psychological interdependence, and they were non-nomadic—that is, they promoted no errancy or *anomie.*[58]

Characteristic of Imerina society was the presence and power of the ancestors. This conviction structured the Merina's religious practices and customs. Indeed, Mannoni observes, the notion of "custom" translates as that which precisely "*makes one live,*" according to some communities (*Le Racisme revisit*é, 98). Thus the proverb: "the living are like the branches of a lemon tree, at the base there is but one branch" (*Le Racisme revisit*é, 89). Custom and the ancestor cult promoted a personality structure that depended on absent "fathers," Mannoni concludes. Against this, Fanon countered, "Since Galliéni, the Malagasy has ceased to exist," working against much of the French ethnography of his time. Indeed, Mannoni had arrived already (1920) a generation after the French implantation. It is therefore hard to know what a Malagasy psychic substratum might have been. "There was no [European] addition to the earlier [Malagasy] psychic whole. If, for instance," Fanon parodies, "Martians undertook to colonize the earth men—not to initiate them into Martian culture but to *colonize* them—we should be doubtful of the persistence of any earth personality" (*Black Skin White Masks,* 95).

Fanon thus reminded Mannoni of his own project: "the Malagasy exists *with the European.*" That means, against Mannoni's thesis, that there is no for-himself structure intact beneath that *Mitsein.*

"I begin to suffer [dependence or inferiority]," writes Fanon, "to the degree that the white man imposes discrimination on me, makes me a colonized native, robs me of all worth . . . tells me that I am a parasite on the world . . . 'that my people and I are like a walking dung-heap that disgustingly fertilizes sweet sugar cane and silky cotton'" (*Black Skin White Masks,* 98). Now, no realistic appraisal of colonialism can ignore this. Yet both Fanon and Mannoni's positions owe their insights to a psychology of culture. And they are in deadlock. But we have to ask: what *happens* to memory and to its narratives? While Fanon's Madagascar almost resembles the Martinican situation, Mannoni has given us an indigenous psychic structure that passively *accepts* colonial rule. The irony is that each position has something right to it: Mannoni wanted to disengage the Imerina cultures he observed from the Western obsession with death, and from the (Western) universality of the Oedipal structure. Thus he

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argued that the Merina father holds authority over wife and children but remained subject to *his* father, whether dead or alive. In fact, once the father dies, his power grows—as authority but also as fecundity.[59] For this reason, as Fanon *also* noted, there seemed to be no Oedipal complexes within Malagasy culture. But the consequence, which Fanon denounced as locking in a presumptive and convenient dependency, was that the Western drive to overcome father figures, and the accompanying *guilt* that Freud observed in the wake of the internalization of the father (the murdered father), do not take shape in Malagasy culture.

Both analyses, Fanon's and Mannoni's, provide insight into seeing white and seeing color; both are rooted in psychoanalysis, though Fanon was more sensitive to economic dynamics in colonialism. What is more, regarding the question of death and mortality, Mannoni makes a striking point, writing lines that make us think of critiques of Nazi intellectuals. He argues:

> It is that Europeans believe *in death*, and death for them is but an object of troubling doubts and questioning. The Malagasy believe *in the dead* but not in death; this is why, having the [ancestor's body] with them, they have need neither of rites nor [other] decorations. . . . [Thus] to understand the situation of a Malagasy child in a family whose ancestors constitute its most important part, it would be necessary to imagine a European family in which . . . all the authority belonged to a grandfather stricken with paralysis. (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 96–97).

Mannoni is justifying a social and psychological dependence as trans-generational for the Malagasy. But the argument carries a more compelling intuition into death in twentieth-century Europe. Given Fanon's understanding of the *political* reality of colonization, the worth of Mannoni's psychology here *turns* on the question: What happens to memories, to narratives, and to Imerina custom in the wake of colonization? Now, Fanon was justly infuriated with Mannoni, for the latter was no trivial apologist of colonialism or seeing black. Yet it is impossible to determine what remained of Imerina memory, stories, and custom, because it is part of a larger debate about colonialism as rupture and catastrophe, or as the interruption of a much longer history. It is not even clear to me whether Mannoni has stumbled, in his research, onto what George Clement Bond called "buried knowledge" or whether he had researched the Sakalava and Mahafaly (tribes of the Maroserana, the other "nation" that did not live with the Merina) culture[60] and benefited from those stories "to distance colonizer from the colonized."[61] The boundaries of psychoanalysis are economics, and history, so far as it is decidable.

The consequence—Malagasies' "complex of dependency" to which Mannoni refers arrogantly—is clear for us. There is more to seeing color than "native" dependencies.[62] There is more to seeing white than seeing a new instance

of power (colonial rulers), supposed to take the place of the ancestors' power. This is the failed side of Mannoni's work.

Yet those arguments for the dialectical structure of personality, cosmology, and "civilization" were above all directed toward Europeans, with a view to showing how whites *could not see color* beyond their projections. The point Mannoni was groping toward concerned power. To the degree that power is not something one wrests oedipally from a dominant male figure, this is because power cannot be possessed durably, like an object. For the Malagasy, of course, Mannoni's intuition about the colonials could scarcely survive the test of the real; that is, forced labor, forced cultivation, and terror. But Mannoni reminds us that he is making another point about power: against Western missionaries' insistence upon Malagasy, and other indigenous peoples' childishness, the colonials' aggressivity bore, for the Malagasy, what Mannoni deemed a corresponding infantilism (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 87)—and, I would add, a dangerous, compensatory one. If the experience of the Malagasy was dual, one of fear and perception of European infantilism, then how can we deny that different cultural patterns, different perceptions, did not underlie the weight of colonial domination? In any case, the Europeans' suppressed inferiority, their anxiety about the authenticity of their own freedom is only half the problem. Fanon insists that the Europeans (and it would seem to be true for white Americans) were unconscious of any inferiority. Be that as it may, Mannoni's extensive reflection on infantilism was also designed to challenge the interpretations of ethnologists like Lévy-Bruhl, who labeled "infantile" what they perceived as a generalized lack of gratitude or predictability among "blacks."[63] After Mannoni, however, Fanon provided a different explanation, using the experience of "Medicine and Colonialism:"[64]

> The first thing that happens is that the patient does not return. This in spite of the fact that it has been clearly explained to him that his ailment . . . requires that he be examined several times at given intervals. . . . it has been explained to him and re-explained, and he has been given a definite appointment with the doctor for a fixed date. But the doctor waits for him in vain.[65]

By some interpretations, this conduct amounts to "infantilism"; by others, it is tied to "native traditions," according to which a cure does not "progress little by little" but must be "assaulted . . . in a single swoop."[66]

Fanon's explanation thus begins with the tones of the old ethnography, only to veer toward its own analysis of power and ambivalence:

> Colonial domination . . . gives rise to and continues to dictate a whole complex of resentful behavior and of refusal on the part of the colonized. The colonized exerts a considerable effort to keep away from the colonial world. . . . In everyday

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life, however, the colonized and the colonizers are constantly establishing bonds of economic, technical, and administrative dependence. Colonialism obviously throws all the elements of native society into confusion.[67]

Mannoni's analyses were thus mired in what Fanon called "patterns of conduct existing before the foreign conquest."[68] By his arguments, seeing white proves inseparable from seeing conquest, violence—and "capital," as Senghor wrote (*Black Skin White Masks,* 133). From several citations in his text, it is clear that Mannoni spent most of his time with the Malagasy free mercantile caste, or "Hova," themselves at one time a conquering power on the island. Now, the development of his perspective after the 1947 massacre—one hundred thousand killed by the French colonial power—is addressed in his essay "The Decolonization of Myself," solicited by the London periodical *Race* in 1966 (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 317–26). There, Mannoni showed himself defensive and skeptical about everything tied to *Négritude.*

On the other hand, despite Fanon's polemical statement that French society is simply "racist society" (as was or is Britain, the United States, etc.), the French racial imaginary was a necessary but not sufficient condition for attending the Parisian École Coloniale, to join the Corps of Colonial Administrators. The question of who joined, and why, suggests a composite picture of cultural anxiety, romanticization, and quest for isolation and freedom—as well as the desire to dominate. Mannoni's insights here seem to be borne out by William B. Cohen's study, "The Lure of Empire," as well as by the work of Catherine Hodeir and Paul S. Landau on colonial exhibitions and imagery.[69]

At their best, Mannoni's arguments rejoin those of the early Frankfurt school, treating *bourgeois* individualism as a social regression.[70] For Adorno and Horkheimer, European modernity unfolds with a mechanistic understanding of causality, likewise engendering an atomized sense of self whose passage into late modernity is characterized by anxiety, myth, and nostalgia. The modern nexus brings the striving for a fantasized autonomy into tension with its possible realization. The predictable outcomes range from melancholy to aggressivity. Colonial racism itself brings this tension forth (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 173). Seeing the Other thus carries with it the attempted actualization of colonizers' projections (from the aforementioned eroticization to variations on the binaries of adult-child, etc.). And this actualization relies upon a massive incomprehension of the culture into which the European has stepped. Of course, Mannoni is only partly correct, having set colonial conquest and domination largely out of the picture—perhaps his incredible *escamotage* of raw violence (which prompted Aimé Césaire to say that Mannoni just "has an answer for everything") was itself a psychic defense.

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Ultimately, it is not surprising to find the silence here; and it was not unique to Mannoni's ethnography. The difference is that he later found himself shocked by it—retroactively?—following the 1947 massacre; shocked into attempting a "Decolonization of Myself."

Mannoni's best intuitions include his observations of the European "complex" and drive for isolation in the works Kipling, Defoe, Thomas Swift, and others (it is striking that his main authors are English and that he spends little time with Rousseau; but then, the impact of Kipling on French bourgeois youth was also striking).[71] He speaks of the "Prospero" personality and a Robinson structure:

> A first remark, of great significance, is that the [fictional] shipwreck victim is still less unhappy in [his] absolute solitude than when he is afraid of *not being alone.* We must insist on this paradox . . . man is afraid because he is alone, and this fear is the fear of others. The fear of solitude is the fear of an intrusion. (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 157)

But the other is desired only on man's own terms; he "fears and desires" this other in the "ambivalence of a complex" (*Le Racisme revisité,* 157). And once this *Mitsein* is established, the personalities stand in tension to each other, to the obvious peril of the "colonized."[72]

It may be that Mannoni's discussion of the "Prospero complex" was what first interested Fanon in his work. Before beginning a respectful but thorough critique of Mannoni, Fanon writes: "When I embarked on this study, only a few essays by Mannoni, published in a magazine called *Psyché,* were available to me."[73] "I was thinking of writing to M. Mannoni to ask about the conclusions to which his investigations had led him" (*Black Skin White Masks,* 83).[74] Certainly it is Prospero who corresponds to Horkheimer's profile of the "civilized." Moreover, "Whatever the reenactment is directed against, however unhappy it may itself be—Ahasuerus and Mignon, exoticism which evokes the promised land, beauty which summons the thought of sex, the animal whose hint of promiscuity condemns it as repulsive—draws down on itself the destructive fury of the civilized, who can never fully complete the painful process of civilization."[75]

We hear the echoes of Horkheimer in Mannoni's diagnosis.

> C. G. Jung expresses it thus: "Seen from a certain distance . . . it appears that this little part of humanity (Europe) has projected its own mental derangement on people whose instincts are still healthy."[76] This sentence gives us the essential part of what happens; and, largely, the image that we create for ourselves of these peoples is indeed a reflection of our own internal difficulties [*difficultés intérieures*]. (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 293)

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But he adds, on a personal note: "it is not sure that such an attitude has a cathartic value; it inclines us a bit too readily to refuse interhuman situations" (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 293). And in a real gesture of self-reflectivity:

> It is not a matter of finding a psychological explanation for the facts of colonization. It is a matter of knowing why we see them in a certain perspective that deceives us [*qui nous trompe*]. After all, psychology has nothing very useful to say to us about true perception, but *it alone can explain* to us *the illusions of meaning* . . . it can teach us almost nothing about a correct reasoning, but it alone is capable of giving some meaning to a delirium. (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 293–94)

That is psychology's best hope for contributing to a phenomenology of seeing white or black. The question, in the matter of seeing white (if we can speak of "seeing" at all, since Derrida and Horkheimer both demonstrate that "seeing" is always a comprehension and categorization *without debate,* i.e., *without* "*the self-conscious work of thought*"), is to be clear about the limits of concepts like *Prospero* or *Caliban,* and to confront these with economics and politics. As George Bond put it, "the construction of individual and collective identities (for example, racial, ethnic and national) . . . [is] part of the process of *inventing traditions*."[77]

The ultimate irony is that Mannoni's two types, Prospero and Caliban, seem to come together, or exchange places, by the end of his study: the "dependent" personality recognizes the impossibility of depending on the colonial power and fights for autonomy; the autonomous spectacle engineered by the colonial shatters in his dependency on the colonized, and the preservation of this dependency covers itself in violence. Not a lot of calm roosts for returning chickens, one might say. Indeed, as Fanon points out, the dependency complex of the native just recapitulates Recapitulation theory (ontogeny reproduces phylogeny), which had already been transposed from embryology to civilization, and then was reimposed on cultures thanks to Spencerian social psychologies. As to the European dependency, abjured and projected though it is, it arises from "relationships between childhood impressions and the actual complaint [and creates a] behavior pattern, whose final configuration is subject to some few changes, but whose essential content, whose energy and meaning remain unchanged from earliest childhood, [it] is [thus] the determining factor, even though the relations to the adult environment . . . may tend to modify it." This time, it is Fanon diagnosing dependency, using Alfred Adler's work (*Black Skin White Masks,* 61–62). In each category, and sometimes in both writers' speculation, Horkheimer's "self-conscious work of thought" sometimes gets short shrift. Fanon realized that the work of thought required that one show the limits of psychology *in light of economics and history.* At times, Mannoni also perceived this, as when he penned "The Decolonization of Myself."

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I have tried to show how Mannoni's fundamental insight about the inter-human situation and about crossed gazes that see nothing recalls Horkheimer's analyses of projection. The latter is worth citing when he characterizes the "paranoiac gaze," because it awakens what looks like paralysis to Fanon and dependency to Mannoni. "[T]he one that goes past you, the hypnotic and the disregarding gaze, are of the same kind: in both, the subject is extinguished. Because in both looks reflection is absent, the unreflecting are electrified by them. [And] they are betrayed . . . the self-encapsulated figure remains a caricature of divine power."[78]

This suggests a meeting point for Fanon and Mannoni. But where Mannoni drew back into his categories, Horkheimer and Adorno pressed on to show the relationship between "positivism," paranoia, and magic in European modernity. "Objectifying thought, like its pathological counterpart, has the arbitrariness of a subjective purpose extraneous to the matter itself and . . . does to it in thought the *violence which later will be done in practice*."[79] In the unintended rapprochement of his two complexes ("Prospero" and "Caliban"), Mannoni, it seems to me, *enacted the antinomy of psychoanalytic positivism.* Fanon and Césaire called him on his own gaze. Why he did not move toward the type of critique that was suggested *precisely by the failure of his two types to be either complementary, or opposed, or dialectizable,* is another question. It has brought me, however, to what I hope is a double claim: for the value of psychology for addressing Husserl's neglected "indications," *and for the danger of psychology* as "saming" technique and metalanguage "that has an answer to everything." I therefore propose a return to one philosophy of the gaze, in an existential and moral sense. My return does not *supplement* psychology, this time. That has to be the work of historians, cultural theorists, activists. It only explores how seeing white might begin in the unchosen decentering of the gaze.

### VI. Seeing "White" as a Return of the (Sartrean) Gaze

As I argue above, seeing white is not really about seeing per se. Husserl's elaborate bracketing techniques, designed to "see" the *things themselves,* speak volumes for Horkheimer's conclusion that seeing is always also understanding, even if false understanding: seeing is categorical. Consequently, the leap that seeing makes, to give back to its object a plenitude commensurate with the sensuous excess that the object, that all objects of sight, gives to it—involves projection. Under political or racist circumstances, the danger and regressive potential of this conclusion is obvious. A critical psychology can bring some sense to "delirium" (and I stayed with Mannoni because of his resemblance to

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Horkheimer and because he shows a deep culture side of modern, psychic whiteness, when read with Fanon). But psychology cannot stand wholly outside that delirium. How then can we interrupt the movement of delirium? Often, we cannot. Yet some kind of seeing white may occur (at least for the unconsciously white and those who identify as such . . . ) if the delirium of a perspective (say, on "others") is interrupted. This is something Fanon and Césaire did for Mannoni.[80] Can we examine this interruption for its existential power?

Joan Copjec's use of Sartre's "regard" in *Being and Nothingness*, which she calls the "gaze," to separate it from the "look" of the voyeur, allows us to glimpse both what *happens* in Mannoni, only to be covered over by him—and what was excluded by Husserl's phenomenological bracketing of psychological consciousness. This incipience and this exclusion are indispensable to understanding, beyond the colonial epoch, what it might mean existentially to start to see white.

According to Sartre's example, a voyeur, looking intently through a keyhole, "is absorbed in his own act of looking" or seeing, "until suddenly he is surprised by the rustling of the branches behind him, or the sound of footsteps followed by silence."[81] Copjec writes, "At this point the *look* of the voyeur is interrupted by the *gaze* that precipitates him as an object, a *body* capable of being hurt."[82] Now, unlike Husserl's other who is constituted *by me as my alter ego*—Sartre's gaze combines danger and an anonymity so basic that "I" *cannot constitute it on any mode of an "alter ego."* The gaze shakes up my implicit conviction that the world is my spectacle and my script. It displaces my stance as a subject—the phenomenologist's subject as well as the psychoanalytic one. Yet, for Sartre, "I can be sure that others exist *because I encounter a gaze*" (*Imagine There's No Woman*, 209, emphasis added). Although the gaze destroys the hegemony of my private perspective (here, through the keyhole) and makes me into an *object* symmetrical with the one I was constituting *for myself*, I do not encounter the subject of that gaze, only the *trace* of that subject (through the sound of footsteps, rustling, etc.). Yet, despite its power to reverse perspectives, the gaze is an everyday thing, a visual or auditory event related to Husserl's "indications": concrete, recurrent, daily, and anonymous.[83]

Unlike Husserl's phenomenology of the other, which Derrida questioned; unlike the complexes merging in Mannoni's argument, the gaze freezes any possibility of symmetry or reciprocity between observer and observed. No ultimate recognition—whether in the medium of analytic understanding, in a "negotiation," or in a co-constitution of same and other—proves possible. Sartre writes, "'The Other [of the gaze] is inapprehensible; he flees me when I seek him and possesses me when I flee him'" (*Imagine There's No Woman*, 210).[84]

Seeing white begins—in a psychopolitical sense—when the keyhole watcher is threatened by a rustling or a step. Although the use of the term

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*white* for Europeans or Americans predates this, it seems to me that seeing white begins when, forced into him/herself, the looker experiences him/herself as a thing—the very thing she or he was constructing through his/her keyholes. However, this evidence that there are others *out there* also means that the watcher, the seer, is seen, put in question as seer, and constituted as a someone who has now become an object-for. This is why seeing color does not give us seeing white as a truly psychological or political act. This is also why seeing white means nothing much, so long as the conceptuality, and the sedimentation of memory and affectivity *within several cultures*, do not intertwine with the intentional life of phenomenological perception—all the way down to its passive synthesis. That is why seeing white erases itself up until a gaze constitutes the observer as a nonsubject. This is why seeing white abjures itself in the temptation to return to a certain universality ("after all, we are all really human"), or in returning the seer to the position of the neutral emitter of discursive judgments ("as philosophers, *we* shall explore how *an I* is made into an object by . . . "). The gaze that inaugurates a sort of apprehension—the same gaze that actualizes a "seeing white"—halts the pen of a writer like Mannoni, until he or she adds, "And I was soon obliged to realize that my book couldn't *not* be interpreted in a political sense." (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 319). This is not enough. But it joins the political of the everyday that Holt, Hodeir, and (many) others have described. It joins the political of anxiety and indeterminacy and may unleash violent reactions. But I think it is there, in the turning of the gaze, that different seeing begins.

## Afterword

The three moments in this chapter are moments important to me personally; they interlock, even if, at the same time, I have obscured my own sense of seeing white, being white, within them. The funny thing about phenomenology, so long as we (I, you?) realize that perception is covered by the words and ideas we (I, you?) use, is that it generates values. Reading Levinas and Derrida thrust me toward the question of "seeing Jew" and the history of anti-Semitism. Beyond that, reading feminist philosophy and working with groups of women in France and the States opened me to women's issues. I was part of Maoist movements in the seventies and beyond that. Nothing very unique in that. Psychoanalysis taught me that there are judgments and values that I hold—sometimes act on—without being able to bring them painlessly to consciousness. Some stand in silent but structural contradiction to those that I *want,* and to those I express. This is why philosophies of perception can benefit from the questions asked by (good) psychoanalysis.

Contradictory and unconscious (or semiconscious) beliefs and values are what contribute to exploitative or impossible *Mitseins.* These must be brought forth, for the "me" who holds them, or the group—and they are political, or a hybrid of political, cultural, and deep psychological factors. No reader of this collection needs me to repeat that the domestic *Mitsein* forged by now - "American" whites with people of color and through economic exploitation is the possible (because it's here) *impossible*—in the sense of unlivable. No reader of this collection needs (the) me (half-showing, half-hidden in this writing) to remark that the *Mitsein* the United States has carved into Iraq invites us (what us is this?) to say that "we just haven't learned"—about colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, and political action.

What is missing for a learning curve? I don't know. I do know that when something like psychoanalysis, or literature, digs deeper than the phenomenological examination of what we see and what we say—into the what-we-didn't-want-to-see-or-say—the unmasking must also provide some way of fostering the courage to see and to say.

I'm reminded of a man, long misunderstood, Ralph Ellison, who wrote an entire novel, it seems, to come, at the end of it, to the shattering remark, "Who knows but that, on the lower frequencies, I speak for you?"[85] (Only to see his subsequent novel's "speaking" destroyed by an arsonist in Massachusetts.) The present chapter speaks for me. But who is "me"? I am a first-generation white of vague background and an absent father. I am this because, when my white mother arrived in New York in 1946, her "Scandinavian" looks (she had not finished high school) landed her a job at CBS—and later, a white, well-to-do husband. No need to compare her fate with that of any other person foreclosed (by color, environment, by revolt . . . ) from the sort of white performance of class, of "breeding," that my mother took up.

A story illustrates why seeing white is hard to bear (yet necessary, I believe; it is *how* to see white more consistently and more politically, that is the question). When Mannoni set out to write about racism, he took refuge behind psychoanalysis. I've seen (white) people, white philosophers, seek refuge behind a host of protective barriers whose purpose is to make speaking to others (white and nonwhite) something they *can believe they can do.* Mannoni—who wanted to show that there did exist *a* discourse with which to analyze relationships of dominance and perceptions of white and black—found himself astonished by charges that his discourse was *political.* He was surprised that his psychoanalysis carried romanticism and the circular logics by which intellectuals find, willy nilly, precisely what (they didn't realize) they were looking for. That was not his intent. And this chapter no doubt shows what was not my intent: the veils that protect me, so that I can speak; or hide me, so that I think and see, up to a point. To the story, then.

Around 1992, I arranged to meet a (white) friend for brunch. She was going to (a largely white) church and I agreed to join her before going to brunch. She gave directions to the church from her home. I lost the directions and went to a church near her apartment. I walked over to an old Boston Back Bay church and entered. The service had not begun; the organ was playing, the congregation numbered about one hundred fifty people, three of whom were white—not counting myself. I didn't see my friend, but I decided not to walk out from a strange mixture of feelings that combined guilt, decorum, curiosity, and a kind of "it's a good thing to stay." The service progressed, we took communion from little glasses which, when it came my turn to lift one, was difficult to raise because my hand trembled. The pastor placed his hand on my shoulder, I believe, to comfort me. He also invited me to return, at the end of the service. And I wanted to return.

I did not return. The moments in the service, for me, were those of the "white" constituted as other, this time under benign gazes without any one single source other than perhaps the pastor—hardly Sartrean, yet other. When I told a black friend about my shame over my inability to return and my suspicion that here lay the bottom line of my own racism, she laughed. She said, "You're just not used to having a color, are you?"

Seeing white is harder than taking on the academic or liberal talk of "white flight" or "that's a really white town," all of which have become cost-free to intellectuals. Seeing white means more than letting oneself be seen. Does it mean creating and staying in sites where white is a color, a class, and a shifting, adaptable system of power fragments? In Boston, I couldn't bear the "whiteness" . . . of me, although "me" is also not singular. . . .

And yet a seeing-white is in a sense happening—along with regressions, some of them terrible. "White" becomes "visible" as white loses its power to authorize its own norms and legitimate its own unconscious: demographically, politically, in the academy. Perhaps I have to ask, writing these words: What, or whom, do I think I want to see *change* while I sit at my desk? This question is, for me, the site of too many illusions.

I know of a few philosophers who have challenged the (philosophical) faith that "reason" can "teach" people (and who are these people?) that seeing color and not-seeing white must be open to criticism. Impressive in some of their pessimism, a pessimism historically justified, is that some of these philosophers also invest their time and their work in making white visible, in unveiling the strategies of othering. So their pessimism about "reason" does not hold them in immobility. A kind of acting against expectations, or against oneself.

The possibility of sustained seeing white in self must arise with the sense that one (one? I?) is not destroyed by the turning of the gaze upon oneself.

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Even if this destruction is a fantasy—and it is. Gaining this sense concerns mediations—of all kinds: writing, discussions, groups, friendships. Even the conviction of the value of analysis, history, and the critical direction of something like Sartre's gaze, will not get one "back into the church" without a sense that the "self," as a historical predicate, is not threatened with destruction if it goes to the church or to where it can see itself as white. That is a process, and one wanders off, forgets, forecloses—because it is not a matter of just living with anger, shame, criticism, with seeing-white.

There is something else, too. Fanon and bell hooks have both written about it. It concerns something like love, or a passion—something that moves our "gaze" inward without shame and outward so that seeing white does not collapse or close up again in self-effacement strategies. Is such a passion born of honesty, of a belief that there is a truth, here, that must be made visible? Is this political honesty? I don't know if passion is born from honesty or honesty from passion. But it's not born from ourselves alone. I don't think I can be honest, can see white, alone.

## Notes

This chapter owes its form and the best of its ideas to discussions with George Yancy, to whom I am enduringly grateful. "Roulez! Il n'y a rien à voir." "*Drive on! There is nothing to see*!"—a familiar expression of French police at the scene of shocking, urban immigration roundups, often conducted by stopping police vans at the intersections of large avenues and demanding identification from all drivers passing through. Here, "nothing to see" lies at the core of the problematic of seeing "white"—a problem rooted firstly in historical sedimentation.

1. In a well-documented history of the development of racism, literary and "scientific," from the Renaissance through the nineteenth century, Gustav Jahoda discusses these three "sciences" extensively. Popular with an array of audiences, and dating at least to eighteenth-century materialist thought, physiognomy established the degree of species development using, notably, Camper's famous 1760s "facial angle" that measured the angle formed by forehead, or ear position, in relation to the jaw. Among other things, it argued that the wider the angle the more "ape-like" the specimen. See Jahoda, *Images of Savages: Ancient Roots of Modern Prejudice in Western Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1999), cf. "Towards scientific racism," 63–74.
2. Jahoda reminds us that in nineteenth-century neurology inferior "races" were argued to have *thicker* nerves, whose density then interfered with higher levels of cognition, see *Images of Savag*es, 58.
3. Nineteenth-century morphology, from Cuvier's "Hottentot Venus" (1814) to Charles Richet's "ape-likeness" etiquette for Africans (1919), compared size and position of the gluteal muscles, head shape, length of limbs, notably forearms, as well as

the shape of legs—and feet in the case of "non-white" Jews—to establish species differences, invariably along a scale of more and less evolved. See *Images of Savag*es, 79–92; also see Sander Gilman, "The Jewish Foot" and "Are Jews White? Or, The History of the Nose Job" in *The Jew's Body* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 38–59, 169–93; and "Trauma and Trains: The Testing Ground of Masculinity" in Gilman, *Freud, Race, and Gender* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 113–68.

4. Extensive, often florid, claims about genitals' size and shape, in racist physiology as well as the incipient "sexology" brought what were then called "hermaphrodites" and "hemi-spades" together with "Negroes," all of whom possessed larger, or different (e.g., circumcised) genitals than those of Christian Europeans. The phantasmic quality of these claims is evident in the rapprochement between genital form, intellectual maturity, concupiscence, and sexual activity. Jules Virey (1775–1847), among others, who divided humans into fair and dark and argued for polygenesis (multiple origins of human beings), insisted that color determined every sort of entity in nature, including flowers. He expatiated on the moral deficiencies and sexual organs of "Negroes." See *Images of Savag*es, 69. The sexologists' concern with character, ability, and genitalia persists through the famous Havelock Ellis's *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*; vol. III, "Sexual Selection in Man" (Philadelphia, Penn.: F. A. Davis and Co., 1926), discusses steatopygia and the attraction felt by "the men of the lower races" for "European women," 153.

5. Ernst Haeckel's (1834–1919) contribution to evolutionary theory, sometimes called "recapitulation" or the "biogenetic law" of morphology, whereby different races reproduce the phylogenetic development of animal species, some of which stop developing earlier than others, see *Images of Savag*es, 164. Recapitulation theory overlaps with a curious, long debated theory called "telegony," according to which the race of a male coupled with a female—animal or human—would leave traces in the offspring of the same mother fathered by a *subsequent* father. The famous case of this was the "quagga" (a zebra-like pony) stripes found on a colt sired by an Arabian horse and born to a mare who had first been mated with a quagga. Here, race, in animals or humans, was conceived in light of blood and "mis-alliances"—a holdover from race discourse rooted firmly in "blood lines." The debate about influence or telegony lasted from the heyday of the Great Chain of being conception of natural species in the eighteenth century through Darwin's doubts about clear demarcations between species—discussion of the quagga's mark, famously called the story of "Lord Morton's mare," took place in 1820. Interesting for us, here, is that telegony combined the conception of females as physiological palimpsests (they were "infectable," or "saturatable") for masculine traits *with* an abiding anxiety—among the aristocracy *and* the middle classes—over pure blood, "race," and genetic decay. See Harriet Ritvo, *The Platypus and the Mermaid, and Other Fragments of the Classifying Imagination* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 105–20.

6. On the theory of neoteny, nonwhite children, notably Africans, are said to be born well adapted to their environment, only to see their intelligence "dim" after puberty. See *Images of Savag*es, 174–76.

7. The work of David Eng and others on Asians, assimilation to "whiteness," and the oppressive "model minority" paradigm in the United States opens a different

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perspective onto the white social imaginary and its impact on "others," not to mention a less frequently studied strategy of othering, this time as the "good other"—although not in the sense of "good" or "noble" or "sensuously free savages." See David L. Eng and Shin-hee Han, "A Dialogue on Racial Melancholia," in *Bringing the Plague: Toward a Postmodern Psychoanalysis*, Susan Fairfield, Lynne Layton, and Carolyn Stack, eds. (New York: Other Press, 2002), 233–67. Eng and Han's approach is indebted to object relations theory and to Homi Bhabha.

8. Sander Gilman reminds us that the infamous British slayer of women, "Jack the Ripper," was, according to the official description, a "caricature of the Eastern Jew: 'age 37, rather dark beard and moustache, dark jacket and trousers, black felt hat, spoke with a foreign accent,'" see *The Jew's Body,* op. cit., 113. Popular German literature associated the "nature" of "Blacks" and that of "Jews" under various rubrics of disease in need of healing. German novels after World War I blamed Britain for taking their African colonies, where German health practices were better able to "heal" Africans of their essential and acquired deficiencies. See *Jew's Body,* 215ff.

9. See, for example, the work of Kara Walker, collected in a number of published works including *Presenting Negro Scenes Drawn Upon My Passage Through the South and Reconfigured for the Benefit of Enlightened Audiences Wherever Such May be Found, By Myself, K. E. B. Walker, Colored* (1997), examined by Joan Copjec in *Imagine There's No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), 82–107.

10. Until the second half of the eighteenth century, European philosophers and men of letters evinced attitudes of benevolent tolerance toward "savages" who, some of them argued, were traveling through a stage of civilization that the Europeans had already surpassed; or again, certain French writers extolled the independence of Native Americans and the happiness and Epicureanism of South Sea Islanders they encountered. See *Images of Savag*es, 49.

11. The obsession with establishing separate "races" among even English and Scottish "whites" reached impressive degrees in England (and elsewhere) in the 1850s and 1860s, thanks to essays such as S. Anderson Smith's "The Degeneration of Race" in the *Lancet* (February 23, 1861). See Ritvo, *The Platypus and the Mermaid*, op. cit., 127–29, 253. There, the Celtic and the Saxon "races" are distinguished, but "white" was otherwise visible as well, in the "white" of the Boston, the Lincolnshire, the Nottinghamshire, the Jute or Kent types, etc.

12. See Georges Didi-Hubermann, *Images of the Salpêtrière* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 19XX). The photos and drawings from this and other hospitals show a theatrical "scene" in which many of the women subjects present similar postures and "symptoms," the most significant of which were detailed by the famous psychiatrist, Charcot, and displayed in large paintings in the amphitheater in which he delivered his lectures on hysteria to an international community of psychiatrists and other men of science, including in the early 1890s, Sigmund Freud and Pierre Janet. This is not to say that muscular spasms and contortions might not be part of acute posttraumatic disorders; in question here is *how patients were encouraged to make visual display of themselves as subjects of science*, and how this science perfected essences of disease as readily as essences of otherness like Jewishness or "Blackness." Hysteria, Charcot always argued, was demonstrably *a single, unified malady*.

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13. On the other hand, in numerous essays, we find that "white" *colonial* humanity is rarely taken, for animals or less-than-human beings. Tzvetan Todorov, among others, has shown that the Spanish arrival in the New World corresponded with Aztec astrological predictions of incipient social upheaval. Consequently, the *Conquistadors* were feared, but not dehumanized. Jahoda points out, in his discussion of cannibalism and European observations of Africans, that "There is no evidence that any savages attributed animality to Europeans—if anything, they were perceived as supernatural beings. Similarly, it was only in exceptional cases, when Europeans tried to learn the skills of other peoples, that they were regarded as child-like." See *Images of Savag*es, 109. I return to this point below, in my discussion of Octave Mannoni's study of Madagascar.

14. For an insightful discussion of the tragedies of "color blindness" in Western philosophy—notably in Kant's and Hegel's thought—see Arnold Farr's "Whiteness Visible: Enlightenment Racism and the Structure of Racialized Consciousness," in George Yancy, ed., *What White Looks Like: African-American Philosophers on the Whiteness Question* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 143–58. For a collection of seminal texts, from Kant through Fanon, and the phenomenology of race to the structuralist analysis of race, see Robert Bernasconi, ed., *Race* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2001).

15. In his essay "The Imaginary" (and elsewhere), the social philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis argues that "each society is a system of interpretation of the world" just as "each society is a construction . . . a creation of a world, of its own world." This creative-interpretive activity is not the work of one or many "subjects," Castoriadis likens it to an atmosphere or a "magma" that is "of such a complexity that it defies imagination and is . . . far beyond our grasp; but, more radically, 'subjects,' 'individuals,' and their 'groups' are themselves the products of a socialization process, for their existence presupposes the existence of an instituted society." Nevertheless, this "social-historical field is irreducible to the traditional types of being," what is in question here is, instead, a "social imaginary, or the instituting society (as opposed to the instituted society)," which is never a "'thing,' another 'subject,' or another 'idea,'" but rather their symbolic, floating matrix. See C. Castoriadis, "The Imaginary," in *World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination*, David Ames Curtis, tr. and ed., (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1997), 8ff.

16. Renaud Barbaras, "The Movement of the Living as the Originary Foundation of Perceptual Intentionality," in Jean Petitot, Francisco J. Varela et al., eds., *Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999), 525, emphasis added.

17. See above, 2; also see Gilman, *The Jew's Body,* op. cit., 66–68.

18. Emmanuel Levinas, "L'Œuvre d'Edmond Husserl," in *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* (Paris: Vrin, 19XX ), 21.

19. Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchung* II, 21. In English, *Logical Investigations II*, Denis Fisette, ed. (Dordrecht and Boston, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001). Levinas cites Husserl in his essay "L'Œuvre d'Edmond Husserl" in *En Découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* (Paris: Vrin, 19XX), 21. In English, "The Work of Edmund Husserl" in *Discovering Existence with Husserl*, Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith, trs. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 47–87.

20. Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomenon*, David B. Allison, tr. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

21. That is, the reduction of the contents of our consciousness, as it puts world, or self *as* subject, "out of play"; in brief, as consciousness observes itself *living,* perceiving, and apperceiving.

22. I mean, by binary signfications, those opposed pairs like black-white, natural-cultural, "savage"-"civilized," male-female, healthy-diseased. By branching significations, I mean those clusters of meanings that attach to a given concept and are related to but not governed by binary oppositions. One example in the nineteenth and twentieth century racist discourse includes: colonized-infantile-dependent-passionate-bellicose (and obedient)-unpredictable-irresponsible, etc. This cluster maps onto clusters of sexuality, gender, health, "hygienes," and "therapies," as well as political formations. All of these "cover" *how we perceive*, and there is no perceiving, Derrida shows, without signifiers (words), which invariably come with their own meaning-clusters, even (maybe especially, since there we censor ourselves less) in our inner monologues.

23. But not only Western; unfortunately, we have only to think of Mariama Ba's novel, *Une si longue lettre* (Paris: Le Serpent à Plumes, 2001), among others, which explores the caste and class perceptions of her Senegalais peers.

24. Although perhaps to a lesser degree for Americans and Latin Americans, since slavery involved a domestic colonization to which Europeans could remain, for decades, largely oblivious, which meant they could remain oblivious longer to the effects and contestation of their valuations of race and ethnicity.

25. We must also note, here, that before this shift in perspectives toward an ordering of races took place in the mideighteenth century, only to expand in the nineteenth century, the term *race* meant something quite different. Diego Venturino points out that, in the France of the *Ancien Régime* (i.e., at the beginning of the eighteenth century, prior to the French Revolution, and to the advent of "scientific" or biological racism, *race*—when used at all (as opposed to the human species or *espèce*)—referred to blood, which was either noble or common ("roturier"). Within the Christian "mono-geneticist" paradigm, since all "men" descended from a common ancestor, nobility of blood was historically acquired: one could become noble or nobler, "annobli." Discussion of noble versus common "races" is found preeminently in the historian Henry de Boulainvilliers, whom Annals School historian Marc Bloch called a "Gobineau before the letter." For Boulainvilliers, there was no "white" versus "black" or "yellow" paradigm per se (although for Foucault, Boulainvilliers may have been one of its inventors with his mythology of the Germanic race conquering the Gallic race). Blood for de Boulainvilliers was either pure, in its nobility, or impure, "vil," and pure blood meant "aptitude for virtue." This view persists in the nineteenth century's projective images of nonwhites—including Jews, who, given the spectacle of their bodies (e.g., Jews' "weak feet," etc.) or their characters (Africans' infantilism)—as incapable of managing their affairs well and by extension, entering into public or political life. Nevertheless, the notion of race that was anchored in "blood" was also a history-rooted notion. Thus, in his *Essai sur la noblesse de France, Contenant une Dissertation sur son origine et son abaissement* (Amsterdam, 1732), Boulainvilliers writes: "It is thus true that men are naturally equal in the part they have of reason and humanity; if some-

thing distinguishes them personally, it must be virtue or the proper use of this reason: but it would be a false consequence if we concluded, concerning this principle, that it is the sole distinction that should rule amongst men. The examples of the first time we just touched upon, teach us the age [*l'ancienneté*], the use, and the necessity of nobility, the perils and the disorders befalling a State when [nobility] ceases to occupy the first rank. And the same reason, which has made us understand what we owe to virtue, makes it palpable that it [virtue] is more ordinary [regularly perceived] in the good races than in the others." See D. Venturino, "Le paradigme nobiliaire," in Sarga Moussa, ed., *L'idée de 'race' dans les sciences humaines et la littérature (XVIIIe et XIXe Siècles)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003), 31. Venturino cites a passage from Boulainvilliers first cited by the Belgian anthropologist, André Devyver, in his *Le sang épuré. Les préjugés de race chez les gentilhommes français de l'Ancien Régime (1560–1720).* However considerable the persistence of early eighteenth-century *value judgments about blood*—it is certainly evident in Nazi eugenics—the "scientific" framework contributed one essential thing to racist discourse and values: "genetic" or "biological" (read: essential) immutability of race, or whiteness and blackness. Crossracial marriage could thus only "pollute" biological "whiteness," while "whiteness" could only ameliorate "blackness" etc., virtue, warrior nobility, and other related "historic" values did not modify an essence rooted in the body and the psyche—once biological racism gained a foothold.

26. See de la Mettrie, *Man: A Machine*, Gertrude C. Bussey and M. W. Calkins, trs. (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishers, 1961), first published in 1748. For de la Mettrie, the body was a machine that wound its own spring, and that which we commonly call "soul" was something more like a personality, itself rooted in the body and its processes.

27. Both of which were only rendered more complicated by debates between monogenetists and polygenetists (one versus many origins of historical humanity) and by a non-Lamarckian evolutionism.

28. Compare this with Linnaeus's classification of man, before him, as essentially a quadruped animal like the ape and the sloth in his *System of Nature* (1735). See *Images of Savag*es, 41.

29. Materialist scruples that give way, for de la Mettrie, to mythical ones; zoological scruples that gave way, for Linnaeus, to dilemmas of human origins and limits of development.

30. Thus Linnaeus, for his part, further subdivided "man" into the nocturnal "forest man" [*homo sylvestris*, the translation of the Indonesian "Orang-utan"] and *Homo sapiens*, his creature of day (*Images of Savag*es, 41). This time, in the language of daylight versus darkness, "whiteness" is there—incipient but clearly understood.

31. A notable example is anti-Semitism, from the ancient, religious version (Jews as killers of Christ) to speculations about Jews as transmitters of syphilis through circumcision, as natural hysterics, and as anomalous in their way of thinking. See Gilman, op. cit., especially, "Jewish Madness and Gender," 93–168 passim. Also see Gilman, *Freud, Race, and Gender,* op. cit., 66ff.

32. Cf. for example, Gilman's remarks on Cesare Lombroso and Alexandre Lacassagne's criminal anthropology and studies of sadism, in *The Jew's Body,* op. cit., 117ff, 131ff.

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33. "Thanks to" this transmission, but also *motivating* the continuation of transmitted associations with whiteness and blackness.

34. The greatest of the missionaries' accounts is probably Abbé Prévost's sixteen volume, *Histoire générale des voyages* (Paris: 1746–1759), a work whose last volume preceded the *Encyclopédie* by one year and was utilized by it. See Anne-Marie Mercier-Faivre, *La Danse du Hottentot: Généalogie d'un désastre* in Moussa, ed., *L'idée de 'race,'* op. cit., 73.

35. Catherine Hodeir reminds us that, between 1883 and 1958, there were *at least* eighteen colonial exhibitions (i.e., expositions in which "Africa" and "Asia" were featured as "figures" with pastiche or agglomerative constructions of "temples," living "specimens" performing "native crafts" (many of whom were not allowed to leave the exhibit or the makeshift dormitories constructed to that end), etc. The function of these "Universal" (1885, 1889, 1900, 1935, 1958) or "Colonial Exhibits" (1883, 1886, 1894, 1906, 1922, 1924, 1938—to list a few) was indoctrination. To the last, images and performances were caricatural; to the last, it was insisted these exhibits were designed for the edification of Africans—visitors and those being "taught" techniques like farming in the colonies. Powerful events that clearly predated radio and film, they formed the imagination of French, Dutch, and British children, some of whom would later join the colonial civil service schools. See "Decentering the Gaze at French Colonial Exhibitions," in Paul S. Landau and Deborah D. Kaspin, eds., *Images and Empires: Visuality in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 233–51.

36. Octave Mannoni, *Le Racisme revisité: Madagascar, 1947* (Paris: Editions Denoël, 1997; first published as *Psychologie de la colonization* in 1950). This is an essay on colonization and revolt in Madagascar, written between 1944 and 1947.

37. Mannoni writes, "L'image que nous nous faisons de ces peuples [non-européens] est bien un reflet de nos propres difficultés intérieures" (*Le Racisme revisité*, 42).

38. The debate about "transcultural psychiatry" has seen various avatars from Fanon's powerful critiques (1952) of Mannoni (notably his arguments about the Malagasy revolt in 1947 and the massacre that followed), Sartre, Caillois, to critiques of unconscious racism in works on "stress," "ego-boundaries," "guilt" among "Africans" in the anthropological literature of the 1970s. See, for instance, D. Paul Lumsden, "On 'Transcultural Psychiatry, Africans, and Academic Racism" in *American Anthropologist 78*, (Mar. 1976), 101–104. It continues, no doubt.

39. See Franz Fanon's chapter "The So-called Dependency Complex of Colonized Peoples," in Charles Lam Markmann, tr., *Black Skin White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 1967; first published in 1952), 83–108. Fanon was initially interested in Mannoni's essays on Madagascar. However, when the latter's book was published, in the form of psychological profiles of both the Malagasy (mainly, the Merina) and the French colonist (as "complexes" of dependence and of "inferiority," respectively), Fanon realized that, although he spent some of the 1930s and 1940s in Madagascar, Mannoni had little sense of what French colonialism had done to Malagasy culture—i.e., little sense of the "roots" of the "dependency complex"—much less its caste and class dimension. As Fanon writes, "I have tried zealously to retrace [Mannoni's] line of

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orientation. . . . The central idea is that the confrontation of 'civilized' and 'primitive' men creates a special situation . . . and brings about the *emergence* of a mass of illusions and misunderstandings that only a psychological analysis can place and define." Now, since this is M. Mannoni's point of departure, why does he try to make the inferiority complex [of the Malagasy, rooted in a "dependency complex"] something that "antedates colonization?" See Fanon, op. cit., 84–85. Also see Nigel C. Gibson's critique of Mannoni, using Fanon and Merleau-Ponty, in "Mapping Africa's Presences: Merleau-Ponty, Mannoni, and the Malagasy Massacre of 1947 in Franz Fanon's *Black Skin White Masks,*" in George Clement Bond and Nigel C. Gibson, eds., *Contested Terrains and Constructed Categories* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002), 235–58; and Gibson, "Losing Sight of the Real: Recasting Merleau-Ponty in Fanon's Critique of Mannoni," in Robert Bernasconi and Sybol Cook, eds., *Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 129–50. Aimé Césaire, poet and member of the Négritude movement, has similar remarks on the political and economic reality of colonialism in *Discourse on Colonialism*, Joan Pinkham, tr. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972, 2000; first published in 1955), 41ff.

40. It seems that Mannoni is circulating in an upper-class universe in Madagascar. For a French man to become an "administrateur," and not just an "agent," required that he have passed his *baccalaureat* and that he attend the elite École Coloniale (f. 1885) in Paris. William B. Cohen has surveyed this group of men, and provides the statistics of their social origins from 1929 through 1936. (See "The Lure of Empire: Why Frenchmen Entered the Colonial Service" in *Journal of Contemporary History 4,* no. 1 (Jan. 1969), 103–16. In the first year for which we have statistics of students enrolled, 42 percent were children of fathers in "High [French] Administration," 30 percent were the sons of men from "Liberal professions," 14 percent were sons of "Rentiers, small businessmen, *prioriétaires*," while only 1.5 percent of students were sons of "Workers." By 1936, 34 percent came from High Administration families, 17 percent from Liberal Professions, 10 percent from Rentiers, small businessmen, etc., 14 percent from "Workers" (Cohen, 106). Does this point to a class "flip-flop" among the administrators of the French colonies? Perhaps. Would this be why Fanon emphasizes that the colonizer embarked, above all, to make a fortune? I think there may be confusion of levels here: immense fortunes were made by colonial corporations, but "agents" (if they were not also extortionists or contrabanders) were so badly paid that some tried to enroll in the École Coloniale. (Cohen, 105–106). The motivation of individuals becoming "Administrators" was, it seems, about wanting to live in their conception of a "restored status," craving culture-power (23 percent of the 400+ administrators Cohen surveyed gave as their first or second reason: "The desire to spread the grandeur of French civilization"; Cohen, 110). "As an administrator who entered the service in the late 1920s wrote [the time when Mannoni was, himself, in Madagascar], his choice was shaped by a wish 'to change the world.' To assume real responsibilities, to dispose of real powers of tutelage and protection" (Cohen, 110).

Finally, as the director of the École Coloniale wrote in the 1930s, "all the answers throb with the desire for freedom" (Cohen, 108). Freedom and false consciousness? Certainly. These men also listed "exotic women," but as Mannoni points out—and

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Cohen seconds him—they were readers of Jules Verne, Pierre Loti, and above all Daniel Defoe and Rudyard Kipling in translation. "Many of the men who entered the Corps in the 1930s mention the Vincennes (colonial) exposition as having had an important influence" (Cohen, 113). Dreams of robinsonnades, thirst for power, and the false consciousness of "changing a world" not theirs corresponds to Mannoni's own profile first as colonial, then as psychoanalyst of white European values.

41. I am thinking of Nigel Gibson, who, among other things, reminds us that the "colonial revolt" in Madagascar, which shocked Mannoni while he was in analysis in France, and caused him to return to Madagascar, and to write an Afterword to his book, ended in a massacre of over 100,000 Malagasies. *This* Mannoni largely missed, along with Fanon's pertinent argument that the "ancient" Malagasy culture—if there had been a single such culture (debatable since Madagascar was virtually colonized before the French arrival, by a group they called the "Hova," who became landholders and held indigenous slaves)—then it had been destroyed with the implantation of General Galliéni, colonial invader and, from 1896, "Resident-general of Madagascar." Fanon writes, "since Galliéni, the Malagasy has ceased to exist," op. cit., 94.

42. William Cohen cites André Maurois on the impact of British writers like Kipling on French youths. "Between 1900 and 1920 Kipling influenced French youths as few French writers have been able to do . . . His legends and stories inspired the games and shaped the thoughts of French children. . . . I found . . . above all in his books (*Kim, Stalky & Co.,* and *The Bridge Builders*) a heroic conception of life. It was neither exclusively British nor exclusively imperial" (*Figaro Littéraire*, 28 October 1965, cited by Cohen, op. cit., 113). We can imagine that, during World War II and afterward, the heroic conception of life probably was better exemplified by the Resistance and the Communist Party. The *desire*, rooted in *ennui* and the sense of economic and international humiliations, *remained constant.* And intellectuals were *anything but untouched* by it.

43. For a discussion of this, see the remarkable work of Edmond Ortigues, author of *Œdipe Africain*, in "La Théorie de la personnalité en psychanalyse et en ethnologie" in CNRS, *Colloques internationaux du CNRS*: *La Notion de Personne en Afrique noire (Paris 11–17 octobre 1971)*, (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1973), 565–71.

44. Beyond Fanon's serious engagement with Mannoni, a few reviews of his work came out in the 1950s; all of which recognized the absurdity of Mannoni's thesis that Europeanized Malagasies had developed a dependency on the colonists only to feel "betrayed" by them upon the introduction of post-WWII reforms. One review, by Kenneth Kirkwood, pointed to the interest of Mannoni's "assessment of the radically different cultural backgrounds and personalities structures" brought together by the colonization of Madagascar and how new structures emerged from this "encounter" (*American Sociological Review*, 1957). Another review acknowledged that Mannoni was trying "to lay bare the foundation of racialism and the sentiment of white superiority which many Western colonials display," despite its overgeneralization about the "responsibility-freedom dilemma" (see Bert Hoselitz, *American Anthropologist 59*, no. 5, 1957, 939). Bruce Mazlish's "Psychology and Problems of Contemporary History" argued that, while Mannoni makes the error of speaking of "the natives as if they were a homogeneous group" ("seeing black"), despite (or because of) his own "personal in-

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volvement in the situation," the "one overpowering virtue [of the book is]: he places his colonialists and natives in a *direct psychological confrontation.* This is perhaps the crux of his special addition to psycho-historical inquiry." Moreover, after the Malagasy revolt, Mannoni acknowledged what Mazlish called, his own "'counter-transference' problem." See Mazlish, op. cit., *Journal of Contemporary History 3,* no. 2 (April 1968), 163–77. This seems to me why Mannoni's book carries a certain seduction (which Fanon called "dangerous," because its concentration on psychoanalysis obscured the political history of colonialism in Madagascar) and was reprinted repeatedly in French.

Although the purpose of this chapter is not to assess the colonial or postcolonial periods, it is clear that Fanon's and others' argument, that colonialization (from the end of the nineteenth century through the 1950s) represented a traumatic break in the history of the sites and peoples colonized. There is a large and old debate about whether this "rupture" was definitive, whether it destroyed cultures and prior traditions entirely, or whether one should view colonialism from the vantage point of a longer history of Africa cultures. This debate evinces the dangers implicit in psychological *and* economic history. If one respects the reality of colonialism by acknowledging that it created a decisive break with the African past, is one also assuming, thereby, a continuist model of history such that Europe went unmodified by revolution between 1890 and 1950? Can we hold together the rupture position with no reference to the "internal history of Africa and its peoples?" And what of adaptation to the changes brought about, or forcibly introduced, during the colonial period? I am summing up some of the questions raised by Euro- and Afrocentric perspectives; perspectives that R. Hunt Davis called the 'radical pessimist' perspective (which he dates from Fanon) on irreparable rupture versus a more 'continuous' perspective (credited to J. F. Ade Ajayi, Basil Davidson, and others for colonialism as 'one episode in the continuous flow of African history.'" See Davis, "Interpreting the Colonial Period in African History," *African Affairs 72,* no. 289 (Oct. 1973), 383–400. My interest is to highlight the suppositions in and consequences of each position.

45. This appears uncontrovertible: Malagasies may have "seen white" as strange, ugly (grew eyes and pimento beards), and dangerous. Power and colonial violence probably caused a breakup of the Malagasy's perception of self, as Fanon describes (for himself, as Martiniquais). However that may be, Fanon and Césaire asked why the Malagasies called the whites *Vazaha*, or "honorable stranger." They give us the following answer, which emphasizes the endurance of African civility: "Once again, I systematically defend our old Negro civilizations: they were courteous civilizations." See *Discourse on Colonialism*, op. cit., 51, and Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*, op. cit., 99. If we hold this answer, we must then ask another, uncomfortable, question: have we ever known a civilization that was courteous but "*failed to* think of a foreign invader as an enemy"? In short, is there anything else we can learn about the performative "*Vazaha*" that *neither romanticizes nor pseudo-analyzes the Malagasy*? This was Mannoni's question, like Todorov and others. It failed because he too romanticized the Malagasy, *even as he showed how the French imagination romanticized the colonies.* Can such questions be answered without violence? Does it imply that the imagination of an oppressor is invariably more dehumanizing than the imagination of an oppressed

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person or group? I suspect an answer has would have to do with what one can imagine under conditions of surprise and intimidation. For seeing white, Horkheimer has explored the paranoid personality structure and its projections.

46. Fanon, *Black Skin Whites Masks,* op. cit., 113ff. For a contemporary exploration of the "everyday" stories, images, and practices—within a theoretical structure that anticipates the "new historicism," see Thomas C. Holt's study of minstrelsy and "political correctness" in "Marking: Race, Race-making, and the Writing of History," *American Historical Review*, February 1995, 1–20. Holt brings Fanon and Du Bois discussion of racial "gazes" together in this chapter.

47. Todorov's *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984; first published in French in 1982) is a semiotic and psychological study of the Spanish conquest of the Mexico. It asks, and answers in light of tribal portents and prophesies, why there was ultimately not more resistance to the Spanish conquerors.

48. Fanon, op. cit., 154. With this, he agrees with Mannoni, that the fundamental Freudian structuring pattern of the personality, the Oedipus complex, "is far from coming into being among Negroes" (152). But this, Fanon claims perhaps romantically, is because "It is too often forgotten that neurosis is not a basic element of human reality" (151–52). From a structuralist perspective, Edmond Ortigues argues that the "Œdipus complex" concerns the introduction of a third "term" into the mother child fusional binary. In this *structural* sense, it is both necessary and unavoidable *and it does not matter*, according to Ortigues, what sort of notion of a "person" or "persona" it contributes to constructing, since whether Western or non-Western the "person" as subject of attributes, is a fiction, a doubling of the being as in-dividuum, a "soul" or a specter—whether of one aspect or many. See Ortigues, op. cit.

49. Mannoni, *Le Racisme revisité*, 71. His psychoanalytic perspective is hybrid. As he puts it in retrospect, he "used principally theories like those of Karl Abraham and Melanie Klein." In regard to his approach, Mannoni writes, "the cult of the dead such as it exists among the Malagasy (and among many other peoples) can be considered as relating quite well, albeit in the particular framework of collective myths and beliefs, in the psychological preservation of an internalized 'good object,' toward which one must make reparations. Such a cult, whose continuous nature distinguishes it clearly from the sort of mourning that we know and which is subject to temporal discontinuities according to certain laws, effectively insures both prophylaxis and the cure for melancholic depressions, though without have the same protective effect against persecutory anxieties. . . . [Thus] the 'wholly phantastic' world that Melanie Klein discovered in the infant, and which is that of persecution, is the same world that has been preserved among the 'primitives' in another manner than among us" 71.

We return to the question of persecution and the gaze below, with our discussion of Copjec.

50. The Martiniquais poet of "*Négritude*," Aimé Césaire, published his *Discourse on Colonialism* three years after Fanon, in 1955. There, he too took issue with Mannoni, "who has an answer for everything," and cites his psychoanalytical apologetics, which turn on the "dependency complex." See *Discourse*, 59–62.

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51. The move from demand for reform or willingness to "assimilate" on the part of the "*évolués*" or Europeanized colonials has no single decade of origin. But what one scholar called the "stagnant" interwar years gave way, after World War II, to clear demands for independence. This "began" in Algeria, arguably, with the Algerian Manifesto of February 1943, which De Gaulle tried to palliate with reforms. It continued with the declaration of the Indochinese Republic in March 1946, and the manipulative response it received from France led to war in that year. Forced labor and forced cultivation during the War contributed to the mobilization of rural populations, while rising prices of imported goods angered city and town-dwellers. War time loyalty to the Allies, while receiving precious little after World War I, moved toward clear demands for independence over reform or "civil rights" after World War II. The story is, obviously, not "one." See R. von Albertini, "The Impact of Two World Wars on the Decline of Colonialism," in *Journal of Contemporary History 4,* no. 1 (1969), 17–35.

52. Discussions of the "gaze" in colonial contexts are vast. Homi Bhabha has written about British colonial "seeing" and discourse, see *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 85–92. Also see his discussion of the perspectives of the "English gentleman" contrasted with the "new *national* modes of . . . interpreting and speaking the Negro" in "DissemiNation" in Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 291–320.

53. "One adapts to two milieux rather like one adapts to bilingualism: one changes attitudes, and under this change subsists the uniqueness of the deep personality, which is not in question. To be sure, this personality is modified by this apparent duplicity, but without ceasing to obey a general law of evolution that applies to all persons. This law would that all the elements that can coexist in a certain manner be integrated into a unity, while those that are not compatible are repressed [*refoulés*]. Thus, each person is unified, but the unification is never absolute, given the repression. Persons who pass from one milieu to another, and who have preserved their unity through integrations and repressions prove to constitute particular cases of this law" (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 65–66).

54. For a discussion of this "almost the same [as the English] but not quite . . . but not white," for the Indian colonial experience, see Bhabha, *Location of Culture,* op. cit., 89ff.

55. Not to mention his extensive studies of Malagasy children's dream images, which Fanon, justly, tears apart, on the basis of their direct or indirect experience of Senegalese soldiers used by the French as police and torturers. See *Le Racisme revisi*té, 142–49.

56. Is erotic projection subject to gender differences? A spontaneous answer might well be: "of course!" Yet Fanon is precious, here, because he not only points out that the Martiniquais who traveled to France brought with him an eroticized and exoticized image of the French white woman (*Black Skin White M*asks, trs. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 70ff)—but this, in a neurotic structure that, he shows, happens to be black under these circumstances (79). Moreover, he also unfolds the erotic projections in white women's fantasies about "Negroes," the most pathological of which was Mlle. B who "lying in bed and hearing [imaginary] tom-toms . . . virtually *saw* Negroes" (208ff).

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57. The Merina are supposed to descend from settlers from South-east Asia and speak a language from the Malay-Indonesian group. They first occupied the central highlands, but consolidated into a kingdom in 1787.

58. Upon marriage, the Malagasy woman left her family, only to be integrated into the family of her husband who, himself, received thereby an extended family and additional ancestors. However, Mannoni remarks, of the European experience of marriage, "If we consider the European boy, we see that he must take care, at once, of two difficult problems when he marries: first, [he must] accept his independent situation, leave familial protection; and thereupon . . . find a companion [who is] such that she gives rise to no conflicts between his *anima* [ideal desired one] and his maternal *imago* [introjected, live "image" of the mother], whose affective charge is increased by the fact that he [the European boy] suffers and feels guilty for having left his family. . . . The Malagasy boy does not strike so clearly up against the same difficulties *because he does not feel obligated to break his ties of family dependence.* Thanks to the survival of dependency [ties], he spares himself a transformation; and it seems as though he were never disturbed by the maternal *imago*; it always remains unambiguously protective; and his sexuality thrusts him without equivocation toward a *socia* upon which he projects his *anima*" 174–75.

59. "It was till recently the custom of the Sakalva of the Morondava region to decorate their tombs with sculpted wood of a stupefying obscenity—all the more stupefying that the Malagasys are uniformly prudish. Yet these sculptures are present to recall and make visible (and perhaps accessible) the fecundity that resides in the dead" (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 95).

60. See http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/madg_1/hd_madg_1.htm.

61. See George C. Bond and Angela Gilliam, Introduction to Bond and Gilliam, eds., *Social Construction of the Past: Representation as Power* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 8.

62. To be just, Mannoni says, "This civilization [rooted in the cult of the ancestors and producing what he calls "dependence" on them and on figures of power more generally] extends from the Indian Ocean to Melanesia. . . . In Madagascar, one no longer finds more than vague traces of these ancient structures" (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 90). The question is less about vestiges of an ancestor cult than the fact that the dependency he sketches makes the Merina, and any other of the eighteen Malagasy tribes literally *susceptible to, even helped by, colonialism.* This is what made the book dangerous. We have seen this kind of dullness among psychoanalysts before.

63. Mannoni cites Lévy-Bruhl, who provides a battery of tales recounted by English travelers, among which, the following story of one Dr. Mackensie, who cures a "native" with his medicine. "The cured patient says to the doctor, 'Your herbs have saved me. You are now my White [mon Blanc]. If you please, give me a knife.' And he adds, '*It is to you that I shall come henceforth with my demands.*'" (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 83–84). Mackensie interprets this as "a very strange case of confusion in his ideas" and Lévy-Bruhl goes him one better with "the hypothesis that the treatment was not understood by the native" (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 84). Mannoni counters that, manifestly, this is not the case ("Your herbs saved me"). What the Europeans could not *see* was the

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dual absence of that European "inferiority," tied to social structures built on competition and autonomization, and the presence of a dependence, within whose framework "gratitude" entails turning to one's "benefactor" for one's needs—rather than setting about to rid oneself of the dependency by "paying him back" or thanking him once and for all.

In isolation and on first sight, this apparent *defense* of Malagasy behavior is beguiling. And Mannoni adds to it a critical observation on Western hypocrisy. He calls this the "*paradox* of Western gratitude": "The [Western] sentiment of gratitude [*reconnaissance*] thus supposes . . . a loosening of dependency. How shall we understand it and what perspectives does it open for us onto the structure of our personality? The vulgar and commercial conception, according to which gratitude should consist, above all, of an exchange of services and good sentiments is not acceptable—one promptly frees oneself [of it] *through a lack of gratitude, in order to owe nothing at all* in certain cases. Gratitude seems to be an effort to maintain what is at first sight a contradictory attitude: to preserve at the same time the sentiment that one owes much and that according to which one owes nothing. It supposes the *negation of dependence and yet the maintenance of an image of dependence* grounded upon a free will" (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 86–87).

It should be clear from this that Mannoni was ambivalent about the very meaning of "dependency," given European hypocrisy about it. (It is not so much that it is negative per se, but that it is unbearable to the European psyche, which preserves only the appearance of it in order better to be rid of it—this suggest the paranoid structure of which Horkheimer speaks in "Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment.") Still, that Mannoni was *romantic* about "colonial dependency" is, however, obvious.

64. Franz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*, Haakon Chevalier, tr. (New York: Grove Press, 1965; first published in 1959), 128–33.

65. Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism,* 129.

66. Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism,*129.

67. Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism,*130.

68. Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism, 130.*

69. See Cohen, *Art. Cit.,* and Hodeir, *Art. Cit.* Also see Paul S. Landau, "Empires of the Visual: Photography and Colonial Administration in Africa," in *Images and Empires: Visuality in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa,* op. cit., 233–52. An extensive discussion of the breakfast drink "Banania" is found there. Fanon addresses the product's "slogan": "Y'a bon!" (a "patois" distortion of "c'est bon," set in the mouth of one of the famous Senegalese *tirailleurs,* transformed into an avuncular fellow). Also see Gibson's discussion of Fanon and Banania in "Aping Africa's Presences," op. cit., 239–41. Finally, compare with Thomas C. Holt's "Marking: Race, Race-making, and the Writing of History," *Art. Cit.*, 16–18, for a discussion of minstrelsy and its emergent figures from Aunt Jemima to Uncle Ben.

70. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, Edmund Jephcott, tr., Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, ed. (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 244.

71. See Cohen, *Art. Cit.*, 113.

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72. Mannoni writes, after examining the correspondence, and a late text of Defoe, *Serious Reflections*, "Misanthropy, melancholy, pathological need for solitude, projection of one's faults on the other, culpability in regard to the father, repressed sentiment toward a daughter whose sex one wants to ignore, such is the case of Defoe in broad strokes. From there came Robinson, in the manner of a dream. And when this dream was published, *all of Europe realized that it was dreaming it as well.* For over a century, because of this dream, the 'savage' was but that minimum of reality on which the European, more or less infantile or, like Rousseau, incapable of adapting to the real, could project an inward image that a too precise, too well known reality thrust aside" (*Le Racisme revisi*té, 161–62).

73. Of the five essays Mannoni lists in his bibliography, written by himself, the *Psyché* essay is not one.

74. Also see Nigel Gibson, "Mapping Africa's Presences," 244: "Fanon welcomed Mannoni's attempt to understand the colonial dynamic psychoanalytically," but (as Gibson points out clearly) the appearance of the book was a betrayal, Mannoni essentialized the colonized psyche as one of dependency (on ancestors, then on the colonial power) rather than seeing *how* dependency was engendered by colonial terror itself.

75. Horkheimer, "Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment," in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, op. cit., 141.

76. Fanon makes a comparable point, and uses Jung and Adler.

77. See Bond and Gilliam, Introduction to *Social Construction of the Past,* op. cit., 13. We see this played out in essays like R. Hunt Davis's "Interpreting the Colonial Period in African History," *Art. Cit.*; even his "globalist interpretation" joins in, and helps create, an intellectual "tradition" in understanding.

78. Horkheimer, *Art. Cit.*, 158.

79. Horkheimer, *Art. Cit.*, 158.

80. In the "Decolonization of Myself," Mannoni ventures the incredible remark that his book could not fail to be read *politically*—even though *it was not a political exercise at all.* Of course, what is it to try to see "into" the personality structures of same and other in conflict, if not a political gesture of sophistication *and* self-deception? Mannoni sees "white" in his colonials and in himself. He cannot "see white" from the Malagasy position, because as Fanon has shown, he cannot see the screen of the Malagasy personality under colonialism (certain assimilated Malagasy could probably not see it, either, and Fanon is aware of this in the situation of the Martiniquais). The screen facilitates projections of Mannoni's analysis, and these projections have an epistemologically stabilizing effect. Mannoni can continue to believe that the French, *his* French colleagues, are among the least racist people in Europe. But that he could not see the comforting effect of his projections is the zero point of the "political" core of his work.

81. I am largely following Copjec's summary here; see J. Copjec, "What Zapruder Saw," in *Imagine There's No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), 209.

82. Copjec, *Imagine There's No Woman.*

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83. The gaze is "there," certainly: "I stumble on it as a surplus object *in the world*." I encounter it "*directly* through a chance meeting" that destroys "the infinitely receding [or multipliable] horizon of experience on which idealist philosophers place the Other" (*Imagine There's No Woman*, 210).

84. Copjec is citing Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, Hazel Barnes, tr. (New York: Washington Square Press, 1992), 529. Note that the "effect" of the gaze relates to Mannoni's account of the challenge posed to the ancestors' power by the colonists. The "challenge" was *neither* desired, *nor* freely accepted. It had a complex structure that involved a kind of "haunting" even as the Vazaha "gibbered" absurdly "in their ships"–as though the regard of the ancestors was threatened by something like a gaze of the ones "from beyond the seas."

85. Ralph Ellison ends, "Being invisible and without substance, a disembodied voice . . . what else could I do? What else but try to tell you what was really happening when your eyes were looking through? And it is this which frightens me: Who knows but that, on the lower frequencies, I speak for you?" Does this express a moment of a gaze . . . avoided by "you," a "you" looking through, inured to or unprepared for a gaze?" See *Invisible Man* (New York: Random House, 1947, 1972), 439.